The use of article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the case-law of the ECtHR : an effective anti-fragmentation tool or a selective loophole for the reinforcement of human rights teleology? by Tzevelekos, Vassilis.
TZEVELEKOS FTP  4M.DOC 4/14/2010 11:50 AM 
 
621 
THE USE OF ARTICLE 31(3)(C) OF THE VCLT 
IN THE CASE LAW OF THE ECtHR: 
AN EFFECTIVE ANTI-FRAGMENTATION TOOL 
OR A SELECTIVE LOOPHOLE FOR THE 
REINFORCEMENT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS TELEOLOGY?  
BETWEEN EVOLUTION 
AND SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION 
Vassilis P. Tzevelekos* 
Introduction ......................................................................................622 
 I. The Risk of Normative Fragmentation: New Problems, 
Old Contrivances.................................................................628 
A. The Fragmentation Dichotomy: Towards a Telos? ............628 
B. Article 31(3)(c) and Its Late Elevation to an 
Anti-Fragmentation Tool: A Servitore di due Padroni? .....630 
 II. Interpreting the ECHR: Pluralism Within 
a Dualist Décor ....................................................................637 
A. The Dualist Confines of Pluralism in the Means of 
Interpretation.....................................................................637 
B. The Dualist Confines of the Special Nature 
of the ECHR.......................................................................641 
 III. The Use of Article 31(3)(c) in ECtHR Case Law .............645 
A. Normative Aspects .............................................................647 
1. The Complementary Role of International Law: 
Pseudo-Systemic Integration? .....................................647 
2. Conflict Between Norms of International Law 
and the ECHR .............................................................665 
3. Resort to (General) International Law for Questions 
Outside the ECHR’s Subject Matter ...........................670 
 
                                                                                                                      
 * Research Scholar, University of Michigan Law School; Attorney, Athens’ Bar; 
M.Res, European University Institute (Italy); M.A., European Political and Administrative 
Studies, College of Europe (Belgium); DEA Droit international public et organisations inter-
nationales, Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (France); LL.B., National and Kapodistrian University 
of Athens (Greece). The author is grateful to Professor Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor Petros 
Mavroidis, Professor Ole Spiermann, Professor Mark Toufayan, and Mr. Vaios Koutroulis for 
their constructive comments on earlier drafts. The Article also benefited from questions from 
participants at symposia, workshops, and conferences at the European University Institute, 
University of Oslo, Columbia Law School, and the University of Macedonia (Hellenic Society 
of International Law). Author welcomes comments by email to Vassilis.Tzevelekos@EUI.eu. 
The usual disclaimer applies. 
TZEVELEKOS FTP  4M.DOC 4/14/2010  11:50 AM 
622 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 31:621 
 
B. Institutional Aspects: Abuse of the Systemic 
Integration Technique? ......................................................680 
Concluding Remarks: Attempting a Synthesis............................685 
 
That nostalgia for unity, that appetite for the absolute illustrates 
the essential impulse of the human drama. But the fact of that 
nostalgia’s existence does not imply that it is to be immediately 
satisfied. For if, bridging the gulf that separates desire from 
conquest, we assert with Parmenides the reality of the One 
(whatever it may be), we fall into the ridiculous contradiction of 
a mind that asserts total unity and proves by its very assertion its 
own difference and the diversity it claimed to resolve. This other 
vicious circle is enough to stifle our hopes. . . . So long as the 
mind keeps silent in the motionless world of its hopes, everything 
is reflected and arranged in the unity of its nostalgia. But with 
its first move this world cracks and tumbles: an infinite number 
of shimmering fragments is offered to the understanding. 
 . . .  
I can negate everything of that part of me that lives on vague 
nostalgias, except this desire for unity, this longing to solve, this 
need for clarity and cohesion. I can refute everything in this 
world surrounding me that offends or enraptures me, except this 
chaos, this sovereign chance and this divine equivalence which 
springs from anarchy. 
Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus 
Introduction 
Judges must take cognizance of the dangers of legal fragmenta-
tion, and of inconsistency in the case-law, as a result of the 
quasi-anarchic proliferation of international courts.1  
Admittedly, beginning an article on the fragmentation of interna-
tional law with these words of former President of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), Judge Gilbert Guillaume, is a good way to en-
courage any cursory reader to put the work aside. Although 
                                                                                                                      
 1. Gilbert Guillaume, President, International Court of Justice, The Proliferation of 
International Judicial Bodies: The Outlook for the International Legal Order, Address Before 
the G.A. of the U.N. (Oct. 27, 2000), http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pr=85&pt= 
3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1 (last visited Mar. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Guillaume Address]. 
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platitudinous, such an introduction highlights the debate that has devel-
oped around the issue of fragmentation within an institutional 
environment of cross dynamics. The first example President Guillaume 
offered in proof of his conclusion was the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (ECtHR) 1995 decision on the preliminary objections of the Lo-
izidou case,2 criticizing the Strasbourg Court for adopting a different 
position than the ICJ on the effect of territorial reservations with respect 
to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).3 In fact, not only 
did the ECtHR remain silent regarding the relevant ICJ case law, it also 
described, remarkably explicitly, the so-called special character of the 
ECHR, stating that Strasbourg judges “must bear in mind the special 
character of the Convention as an instrument of European public order 
(ordre public) for the protection of individual human beings.”4  
Notably, the ECtHR had provided a response to President Guil-
laume’s criticisms as early as 1996. Almost four years before being 
accused of threatening the normative unity of general international law, 
the ECtHR stated in its judgment on the merits in Loizidou: 
[T]he [European] Convention must be interpreted in the light of 
the rules of interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention of 23 
May 1969 on the Law of Treaties and [ ] Article 31 § 3 (c) of 
that treaty indicates that account is to be taken of “any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties” . . . . In the Court’s view, the principles underlying the 
Convention cannot be interpreted and applied in a vacuum. 
Mindful of the Convention’s special character as a human rights 
treaty, it must also take into account any relevant rules of inter-
national law . . . .5 
Then and now the ECtHR seems to be making a clear point: it has 
consistently denied breaching any of its traditional ties with general in-
ternational law, and has always maintained that the mission of its judges 
is to interpret the ECHR in the light of the international legal order. 
However, as will be shown below, creating an equilibrium between the 
special character of the ECHR and its subordination to the logic and 
economy of the international legal system is a difficult task. This Article 
                                                                                                                      
 2. Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (1995) (decision on the prelimi-
nary objections). 
 3. Guillaume Address, supra note 1 (citing Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR]). 
 4. Loizidou, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (decision on the preliminary objections). 
 5. Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996–VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216, 2231, ¶ 43 (judgment on the mer-
its) (citing 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]). 
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seeks to evaluate the ECtHR’s tacit and explicit applications of Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). 6 The 
International Law Commission (ILC) quite recently brought Article 
31(3)(c) to the fore by suggesting that it introduces an autonomous me-
thod of interpretation—namely systemic integration.7 However, as will 
be argued below, the history of Article 31(3)(c), both in terms of the 
original vision of its drafters and the role it plays in the practice of the 
ECtHR, suggests it may be useful for other interpretative purposes. Tak-
ing these preliminary remarks into account, this Article considers three 
main questions: (1) How effective can Article 31(3)(c) be as a remedy 
against the fragmentation of international law? (2) To what extent may 
Article 31(3)(c) accommodate techniques of interpretation other than 
that of systemic integration? And (3), how should the relationship be-
tween these distinct interpretative methods be conceptualized? 
There are three reasons for choosing the normative environment of 
the ECHR to test the effectiveness of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. First, 
it is useful to do so in order to investigate the following oxymoron: 
among specialized international judicial institutions, the ECtHR is often 
accused of fragmenting international law yet invokes Article 31(3)(c) the 
most frequently.8 Indeed, in comparison with other international courts 
and tribunals, the ECtHR’s case law offers a remarkable illustration of 
explicit references to the article, some of which go back several years 
before it emerged as an anti-fragmentation tool.  
Secondly, the effectiveness of the ECHR system for the protection of 
human rights and the way this effectiveness is reinforced by the legiti-
macy of its humanistic telos turns it into a potential communicant of 
droitdelhommisme, or “human rightism”—the famous neologism intro-
                                                                                                                      
 6. VCLT, supra note 5, art. 31(3)(c) (“There shall be taken into account, together with 
the context: . . . any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties.”). 
 7. According to this method of interpretation, each instrumentum of international law 
must be interpreted and applied in a manner that safeguards harmony within the broader nor-
mative environment—that is, the international legal order. As explained in Part I.B, infra, this 
particular method of interpretation has recently been promoted by the International Law 
Commission (ILC) and legal scholarship as one of the main tools for counteracting the norma-
tive fragmentation of international law. It is widely regarded as one of the main channels that 
enable the concurrence between special and general international law. 
 8. See Jean-Marc Sorel, Article 31: Convention de 1969, in Les Conventions de 
Vienne sur le Droit des Traités: Commentaire Article par Article 1289, 1322 
(Maxime Didat ed., 2006). See also the reprobative comments made by former President of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Robert Y. Jennings, The Proliferation of Adjudica-
tory Bodies: Dangers and Possible Answers, in Implications of the Proliferation of 
International Adjudicatory Bodies for Dispute Resolution 2, 5–6 (Am. Soc’y Int’l L. 
Bull. No. 9, 1995), who argues that the Loizidou decision on preliminary objections is evi-
dence of the danger of fragmentation of international law due to the proliferation of 
international courts and tribunals. 
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duced and used by Pellet to criticize that part of international legal 
scholarship which, in his view, actively and militantly promotes the idea 
of human rights as “idiosyncratic” within international law.9 However, 
scholarly criticism of the ECtHR extends well beyond the classification 
of its system as a self-contained regime.10 The ECtHR not only know-
ingly disregards general international law, but it also intentionally 
introduces into international law elements that are foreign to its tradi-
tional, state-centric structures and that international law cannot 
accommodate. The moral weight of the system of the ECHR, the 
ECtHR’s voluminous case law, and especially its effectiveness in the 
implementation stage (with certain well-known exceptions), transform 
the ECtHR from a modest regional international judicial institution with 
a specialized competence into an influential systemic player. It is in this 
capacity that critics such as President Guillaume reproach the fact that 
the ECtHR refuses to accept the role of a compliant recipient of the dic-
tates of general international law, and instead asserts its right to actively 
participate in the process of this general international law’s interpretative 
evolution.11 Thus, in addition to expressing concern for the ECtHR’s role 
in fragmenting international law, its critics fear that the court stimulates 
the so-called “humanization” of international law.12 Although measuring 
                                                                                                                      
 9. See Alain Pellet, “Human Rightism” and International Law, 2000 Italian Y.B. 
Int’l L. 3. Despite his diplomacy, Pellet clearly accuses the “human rightist” scholarship of 
promoting the “idiosyncrasy” of human rights, as well as “tak[ing] their desires for realities 
. . . as legal truths.” Id. at 5. 
 10. On the origins of the term, see Bruno Simma, Self-Contained Regimes, 1985 Neth. 
Y.B. Int’l L. 111. The term’s actual content has been defined amply. In legal scholarship, the 
term “self-contained regime” has been used to imply both an international legal subsystem 
entirely separate and autonomous from general international law, and a legal subsystem which 
simply contains a set of leges speciales designed to exclude only the application of the general 
legal consequences of international wrongfulness, that is to say the secondary norms of inter-
national law on state responsibility. For more details on these definitions, see Bruno Simma & 
Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law, 
17 Eur. J. Int’l L. 483, 490–93 (2006). 
 11. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique 
and Politics, 70 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (2007). Koskenniemi explains very eloquently that 
“[s]pecializations such as ‘trade law’, ‘human rights law’, ‘environmental law’, ‘criminal law’, 
‘security law’, ‘European Law’ and so on started to reverse established legal hierarchies in 
favour of the structural bias in the relevant functional expertise . . . . It is this change to which 
international lawyers have reacted by speculating on the ‘dangers’ of incoherence, forum 
shopping and, perhaps characteristically, ‘loss of overall control.’ ” Id. at 4. 
 12. However, in order to avoid giving the wrong impression, it is important to note that 
most legal scholarship welcomes the impact of human rights on public international law. The 
title of Theodor Meron’s 2003 course on public international law at the Hague Academy of 
International Law speaks for itself. See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Interna-
tional Law (2006). Judge Bruno Simma devoted his own general course at the Hague 
Academy in 2009 to The Impact of Human Rights on International Law. See Bruno Simma: 
Principal Publications, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/?p1=1&p2=2&p3=1&judge=14 (last vis-
ited Mar. 26, 2010). For a summarized analysis of the humanizing effects of international 
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the influence of the ECHR’s regime over the broader general system is 
beyond the scope of this Article, what can be legitimately presumed here 
is that whenever the court relies upon its so-called pro-homine specialty 
to diverge from the economy of the broader international legal order and 
turn a deaf ear to the tempo given by its premier institutions (as it did in 
Loizidou),13 then not only does it fragment the unity of this broader legal 
order but it also challenges the fundamentally state-centric (which is not 
to say voluntarist) premises on which it is based. An effective Article 
31(3)(c) (at least in the sense that the ILC promotes) requires that the 
Strasbourg Court—a regional court entrusted with the interpretation of a 
“special” convention—identify the center of gravity of its system as out-
side its microcosmos, in order not to threaten the whole systemic (if 
arguably indiscernible) symphony.  
The third and final reason to assess the effectiveness of Article 
31(3)(c) within the paradigm of the ECHR relates to its idiosyncratic 
nature, which is marked by inherent centrifugal tensions that render it 
susceptible to fragmentation. Formally, the ECHR is a typical multilat-
eral international treaty. As such, it is the product of general international 
law—both its own binding force and its normative qualities stem from 
the same general international law. However, at the same time, the Con-
vention presents the qualitative—both normative and socio-political—
characteristics of what will be described infra as a multi-level specialty. 
Although an international treaty, the ECHR also serves as a regional 
quasi-constitution14 that delimits an increasingly integrated public order, 
                                                                                                                      
human rights on general international law, see Menno T. Kamminga, Humanisation of Inter-
national Law, in Changing Perceptions of Sovereignty and Human Rights: Essays in 
Honour of Cees Flinterman 29 (Ineke Boerefijn & Jenny Goldschmidt eds., 2008). For a 
collection of essays on the topic, see The Impact of Human Rights Law on General In-
ternational Law (Menno T. Kamminga & Martin Scheinin eds., 2009).  
 13. See, e.g., Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Preface to L’influence des Sources sur L’unité 
et la Fragmentation du Droit International, at viii (Rosario Huesa Vinaixa & Karel 
Wellens eds., 2006) [hereinafter L’influence des sources] (discussing that, while manifestly 
careful not to outpace the opinio juris of states, the ICJ’s case law seems to be setting the 
tempo of the evolution of general international law). 
 14. The debate about the constitutional functions of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) is long standing and still open. See, for example, the article by the former 
President of the ECtHR, Luzius Wildhaber, A Constitutional Future for the European Court of 
Human Rights?, 23 Hum. Rts. L.J. 161, 165 (2002) (arguing that the ECtHR should limit its 
decisions to “ ‘constitutional’ decisions of principle”). One of the first works to examine the 
question was Jean-François Flauss, La Cour européenne des droits de l'homme est-elle une 
cour constitutionnelle?, in La Convention européenne des droits de l'homme: Dévelop-
pements récents et nouveaux défis 69 (Droit et justice collection dirigée par Pierre 
Lambert No. 19, Jean-François Flauss & Michel de Salvia, eds. 1997). See also Robert Harm-
sen, The European Court of Human Rights as a ‘Constitutional Court’: Definitional Debates 
and the Dynamics of Reform, in Judges, Transition, and Human Rights 33, 41 (John Mo-
rison et al. eds., 2007) (highlighting the “systemic turn” in the case law of Strasbourg, in 
which the ECtHR has focused on specific human rights protection problems); Wojciech 
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and seeks to protect certain values within a very specific geographic, 
cultural, social, political, and economic milieu, namely the European 
continent. Hence, the ECHRs’ so-called specialty is not limited to its 
human rights teleology and the erga omnes partes normative quality of 
its substantive provisions—which, moreover, are characteristics common 
to all human rights conventions. Beyond this obvious dimension of nor-
mative specialty, the ECHR is equally special at the socio-political level 
in that it is called upon to produce results within the particular social 
context that designed its regime and gave it the tools to gradually help 
construct common minimum standards in the fields of human rights, 
democracy, and the rule of law within the single European public order. 
In short, ECHR regime delimits a particular socio-normative environ-
ment in which it is extremely difficult for the systemic integration 
technique to produce anti-fragmentation results.  
Before demonstrating how the case law of the ECtHR gives effect to 
Article 31(3)(c), it is useful to provide certain theoretical illustrations 
that can serve as a basis for the analysis that will follow. In Part I the Ar-
ticle will briefly introduce the question of the fragmentation of 
international law, and will more extensively delineate the role that the 
ILC attributed to Article 31(3)(c) and the ILC’s expectations regarding 
its success in this role. Next, Part II will give an overview of the special 
elements of the ECHR socio-normative environment, which gave rise to 
the case law into which Article 31(3)(c) came into force. The Article will 
argue that, in addition to benefiting from the very special nature of the 
ECHR, the Strasbourg Court also has a significant number of interpreta-
tive tools that allow it to enjoy wide discretion in the choices it often has 
to make regarding the dilemma between unconditional integration into 
the international legal order and its (regional) human rights specialty. 
Once concluded the theoretical part of the study, the Article will proceed 
in Part III to test the use of Article 31(3)(c) in the case law of the 
ECtHR. The object of this Part of the study is to assess the validity of the 
presumptions that Parts I and II introduced with regard to the function of 
                                                                                                                      
Sadurski, Partnering with Strasbourg: Constitutionalization of the European Court of Human 
Rights, the Accession of Central and Eastern European States to the Council of Europe, and 
the Idea of Pilot Judgments (Eur. Univ. Inst. Working Paper No. EUI LAW 2008/33, 2008), 
available at http://hdl.handle.net/1814/9887 (last visited Mar. 26, 2010) (noting that the 
enlargement of the Council of Europe is an opportunity for the ECtHR to adopt a quasi-
constitutional role by ruling on the systemic defects of domestic legal orders); cf. Louis 
Favoreu, Cours constitutionnelles nationales et Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme, in 1 
Libertés, justice, tolérance: Mélanges en homage au Doyen Gérard Cohen-
Jonathan 789, 797 (Luigi Condorelli, Jean-François Flauss, Charles Leben, & Philippe 
Weckel, eds., 2004) (explaining why the ECtHR does not correspond to the European model 
of constitutional justice in which constitutional courts are situated outside of the ordinary legal 
process). 
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Article 31(3)(c) within a special regime of international law. Part III is 
structured at two main levels, and will first address the question of nor-
mative fragmentation, and second its judicial institutional counterpart. 
Finally, Part III will consider the evolutive effects of Article 31(3)(c) as 
these are integrated in the broader question of fragmentation generally, 
and will treat these effects separately in certain instances, as further de-
lineated in that Part. 
I. The Risk of Normative Fragmentation: 
New Problems, Old Contrivances 
A. The Fragmentation Dichotomy: Towards a Telos? 
Although the proliferation of international judicial fora has had a 
beneficial effect on both the development and the effective application 
and enforcement of international rules, it is also due to this same phe-
nomenon that international law is seen as undergoing fragmentation. 
“Post-modern anxieties”15 about the risks of chipping away at the norma-
tive unity of international law and of gradually deforming its legal order 
have added to the more classical selection of worries, and a new theo-
retical dichotomy has thus entered the discipline. If for a classic or even 
a modern international lawyer the dilemma was between objectivism and 
voluntarism, the post-modern generation has to choose between the unity 
or fragmentation of an international legal order that is becoming increas-
ingly pluralistic while not yet confident enough about its systemic 
morphology.  
All the same, it would not come as a complete surprise to suggest 
that the whole fragmentation discourse is nothing more than a pseudo-
dilemma.16 In fact, such a view would have the support of the extreme 
trends of international law. A complete negation of the existence of any 
international legal order and the defense of its virtually absolute unity 
and harmony would appear to be two sides of the same coin, neither of 
which perceive a threat of fragmentation.17 What, however, should be 
                                                                                                                      
 15. See Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? 
Postmodern Anxieties, 15 Leiden J. Int’l L. 553 (2002). 
 16. See, e.g., Mario Prost, All Shouting the Same Slogans: International Law’s Unities 
and the Politics of Fragmentation, 2006 Finnish Y.B. Int’l L. 131, 152 (“There is no objec-
tive or neutral approach to issues of fragmentation. Any discourse on fragmentation reflects 
certain preferences regarding the nature and function of international law as either rules, lan-
guage or values.”).  
 17. See Bruno Simma, Fragmentation in a Positive Light, 25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 845, 
847 (2004) (“To diagnose a process of fragmentation at all logically presupposes that the ob-
server proceeds from an image of international law constituting a whole, something closed 
and firm, which now threatens to fall into pieces.”). 
TZEVELEKOS FTP  4M.DOC 4/14/2010  11:50 AM 
Spring 2010] Use of Article 31(3)(c) 629 
 
highlighted is that, for the majority of scholars, pluralism means hetero-
geneity, which—to a large extent—jeopardizes the integrity of the 
international legal order.18 
The core, then, of normative fragmentation19 could be described as a 
story about normative planets or comets—both in their original general 
content as well as in the more specific content that they have expressed 
since judicial interpretation. These planets either follow a course deviat-
ing from the international law galaxy or else are to be found on a path to 
collision with their Helios—general international law—which tends to 
maintain a systemic equilibrium.20 The former refers to the “special” or 
“self-contained regimes,” which, regarded from a perspective of auto-
suffisance, proclaim a sui generis right to self-determination, reject the 
idea that they are part of the international legal order, and deny coming 
under its structures and general rules. The latter group corresponds to the 
phenomenon of conflicting or incompatible norms within a highly de-
centralized international legal universe, without excluding the well-
known scenario according to which the same international norm has 
been given different effect by more than one court.21 
                                                                                                                      
 18. It should be noted, however, that most scholars emphasize the institutional dimen-
sion of that pluralism (i.e., the so-called proliferation of international judicial bodies). See 
Martti Koskenniemi, What Is International Law for?, in International Law 89, 110 (Mal-
com D. Evans ed., 2003) (arguing that behind the fragmentation problem there is a 
“hegemonic struggle where each institution, though partial, tries to occupy the space of the 
whole”); Tullio Treves, Fragmentation of International Law: The Judicial Perspective, 23 
Comunicazioni e Studi 821, 831–32 (2007) (suggesting that “[u]nderneath the discussion 
[on fragmentation] lies a clash for power between institutions and the persons which partake 
in the decisions of these institutions. . . . It is a debate on whether the last word on interna-
tional law questions must belong to the International Court of Justice, on whether specialized 
or generalist international lawyers are best suited to deal with questions belonging to special-
ized fields.”); see also Antonio Cassese, International Law 45 (2001) (claiming, more 
optimistically, that fragmentation is gradually receding thanks to “interpenetration and cross-
fertilization of previously somewhat compartmentalized areas of international law”). 
 19. The ILC’s approach excludes the institutional dimension of fragmentation and only 
examines the question from a purely normative point of view. See Int’l L. Comm’n [ILC], 
Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶¶ 5–25. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.644 
(July 18, 2003); see also Simma, supra note 17, at 846 (suggesting that the institutional di-
mension of fragmentation should exclude the judicial aspect, since “if there are international 
institutions that are constantly and painstakingly aware of the necessity to preserve the coher-
ence of international law, it is the international courts and tribunals”). 
 20. See Matthew Craven, Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of International Law, 
2003 Finnish Y.B. Int’l L. 3, 32 (“ ‘Fragmentation’ is simply a way of expressing, with cer-
tain obvious overtones, a concern that the disciplinary centre can no longer hold the forces of 
diversity in check.”). 
 21. Given the institutional dimension of fragmentation and the role of inconsistency in 
the case law of various international judicial entities, Pierre-Marie Dupuy pleads for “a central 
role for the ICJ.” See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentation or Unification of the 
International Legal System and the International Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & 
Pol. 791, 798 (1999). Contra Rosalyn Higgins, Respecting Sovereign States and Running a 
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The ILC pointed out early on that the fragmentation phenomenon, 
“as an expression of diversification and expansion of international law,” 
might give rise to both negative and positive results.22 For the optimists,23 
fragmentation can be understood as an expression of maturity; it is 
nothing more than a rather painful step towards the telos 
(end/scope/objective) of the systemic integration of the international le-
gal order. On the other hand, the pessimists conceive of this same trend 
towards fragmentation as evidence of disintegration, incoherence, and 
disunity, bringing general international law closer to a status of ineffi-
ciency and shrinkage, if not to its telos (end/termination).  
B. Article 31(3)(c) and Its Late Elevation to an 
Anti-Fragmentation Tool: A Servitore di due Padroni? 24 
What is important in the context of this Article is not so much 
whether fragmentation is a threat to the integrity or further integration of 
the international legal order, or whether it simply corresponds to a neces-
sary and unavoidable step in the evolution of this order, or both. 
Undoubtedly, any reference to the notion of a legal order structured as a 
system requires at very least a classification of its normative constitu-
ents, as well as a set of mechanisms administering the relationship 
between these differently classified elements. The notion of hierarchy, 
which provides solutions to conflicts between norms of different legal 
standing, needs to be complemented by techniques for the setting of pri-
orities in the case of conflicts between “parallel” rules.25 This is, for 
instance, the role of the two classic principles of lex posterior derogat 
priori (that is, that a more recent law overrules an inconsistent earlier 
law) and lex specialis derogat generalis (that is, that a specific law over-
rules a general law). 
In addition to these conflict resolution mechanisms, the ILC fol-
lowed another route. Taking into account that one of the features 
                                                                                                                      
Tight Courtroom, 50 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 121 (2001) (arguing in favor of judicial decentrali-
zation). 
 22. ILC, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.663/Rev.1 (July 28, 2004). 
 23. Georges Abi-Saab was one of the first to point out that fragmentation also contains 
some “healthy” elements. See Georges Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification: Some Con-
cluding Remarks, 31 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 818, 925 (1999); see also Kalypso Nicolaïdis 
& Joyce L. Tong, Diversity or Cacophony? The Continuing Debate over New Sources of In-
ternational Law, 25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1349, 1361–65 (2004). 
 24. Carlo Goldoni, The Servant of Two Masters (Jeffrey Hatcher & Paolo Emilio 
Landi trans., Dramatists Play Service Inc. 2004) (1743). 
 25. See generally the very interesting course at the Hague Academy of International 
Law by Emmanuel Roucounas, Engagements parallèles et contradictoires, in 6 Recueil des 
Cours de l’Académie de droit international de La Haye (1987). 
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inherent to fragmentation is that of normative pluralism, especially in the 
relationship established between general and special norms or regimes, 
the ILC brought to the fore Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. Although ini-
tially international legal practitioners were reluctant to implement the 
article, as fragmentation became more widespread both legal scholar-
ship26 and the ILC (re)discovered the usefulness of the method(s) laid 
down in the article—this time as an anti-fragmentation tool.  
This provision (the customary nature of which is uncontested),27 
when read in the broader framework of Article 31 of the VCLT, enables 
the judge of any court or tribunal to integrate general international law 
into her judicial reasoning, along with any “relevant” and “applicable” 
special legal obligations which are binding on the parties. In other 
words, Article 31(3)(c) functions as “a ‘master key’ to the house of in-
ternational law”28 and renders possible the inclusion of sources external 
but relevant to the norm under interpretation, thus allowing the judge to 
take into account the broader normative environment. It goes without 
saying that this should always be done following the so-called “principle 
of harmonization,” according to which, when a plurality of norms affects 
the same subject the interpretation should always attempt to achieve 
conciliation.29 
However, the ILC did not limit itself to simply calling attention to 
Article 31(3)(c). It went further30 and recruited the article into the 
                                                                                                                      
 26. See Philippe Sands, Vers une transformation du droit international? Institutionnal-
iser le doute, in 4 Droit International 213, 220–30 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Ch. Leben, 
eds., 2000). As Sands argued, Article 31(3)(c) has a general applicability that may cover the 
relationship between different branches of international law and different norms. Id. at 213. 
According to Sands, Article 31(3)(c) sets up the principle of integration, which seeks unity in 
international law and requires that norms not be envisaged as isolated from general interna-
tional law. Id. at 222. 
 27. See, e.g., Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53, 
69–70 (Nov. 12). Recently, the ICJ reconfirmed the customary nature of Article 31(3)(c). See 
Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), 2008 I.C.J. 37 (June 
4), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/136/14550.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).  
 28. This term was introduced by Xue Hanqin during the ILC debates on the signifi-
cance of Article 31(3)(c). ILC, Final Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of Interna-
tional Law, ¶ 420, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (prepared by Martti 
Koskenniemi) [hereinafter ILC, Final Report on Fragmentation of International Law]. 
 29. On the nature of harmonization, see Nele Matz-Lück, Harmonization, Systemic 
Integration, and ‘Mutual Supportiveness’ as Conflict-Solution Techniques: Different Modes of 
Interpretation as a Challenge to Negative Effects of Fragmentation, 2006 Finnish Y.B. Int’l 
L. 37, 45–47. Starting from the presumption that normative conflicts are not intentional, Matz-
Lück concludes that harmonization is neither a technique nor a tool as such. It simply intro-
duces “a concept in need of the employment of subsidiary methods which serve the higher 
objective of coherence of norms.” Id. at 45. 
 30. Nevertheless, it did not do so until 2005, in accordance with the revised paper sub-
mitted by one of its members, Professor Mansfield. See ILC, Report of the Study Group on 
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services of the systemic integration method of interpretation. In this role 
Article 31(3)(c) deus ex machina introduces a legal principle:31 since in-
ternational treaties are the product of international law and part of its 
respective legal order,32 they should always be interpreted in a way that, 
by taking into consideration the broader normative environment, will 
avoid fragmenting it.33 Gradually, legal scholarship came to second the 
idea of systemic integration. Hence, not only did legal scholarship rec-
ognize systemic integration as a well-established principle of 
international law, but it also generously offered the principle the status of 
a constitutional norm!34  
The rationale underlying this approach is self-evident. The term 
“fragmentation” bears a clear negative connotation: it is considered to be 
a problem, a malfunction of the system, a symptom of disorder, a threat. 
Therefore, maintaining the unity of the international legal order—a con-
ditio sine qua non for this order to operate effectively—becomes an 
                                                                                                                      
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expan-
sion of International Law, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.676 (July 29, 2005). 
 31. See ILC, Final Report on Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 28, ¶ 415 
(“[T]he principle of systemic integration goes further than merely restat[ing] the applicability 
of general international law in the operation of particular treaties. It points to a need to take 
into account the normative environment more widely.”). 
 32. ILC, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties 
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Conclusions of the Work 
of the Study Group, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 (July 18, 2006). The ILC points out that Article 
31(3)(c) “gives expression to the objective of ‘systemic integration’ according to which, what-
ever their subject matter, treaties are a creation of the international legal system and their 
operation is predicated upon that fact.” Id. ¶ 14(17). 
 33. See ILC, Final Report on Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 28, ¶ 410 
(explaining that special instruments are to be applied “with minimal disturbance to the opera-
tion of the legal system”). 
 34. See Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 279, 280 (2005). According to 
McLachlan’s view, systemic integration reflects “a more general principle of treaty interpreta-
tion . . . [that] operates . . . as an inarticulated major premise in the construction of treaties . . . 
[and] flows so inevitably from the nature of a treaty as an agreement ‘governed by interna-
tional law’ ” that it has attained within the international legal system the “status of a 
constitutional norm.” Id. at 280 (quoting VCLT, supra note 6, art. 2(1)(a); cf. Karel Wellens, 
Quelques réflexions d’introduction, in L’influence des sources, supra note 13, at 1, 20–21 
(providing a more cautious approach that raises questions regarding whether systemic integra-
tion has indeed emerged as a principle of international law and whether this would suggest 
that systemic integration—in keeping with the aim of maintaining the unity of international 
law—should prevail over other means of interpretation). Contra Benedetto Conforti, Unité et 
fragmentation du droit international: “Glissez, mortels, n’appuyez pas!”, 111 Revue Gé-
nérale de Droit International Public 5, 16 (2007) (arguing that the ILC’s conception of 
the special role of systemic integration does not find a confirmation in international reality and 
defending courts’ discretion to freely choose among the means of interpretation they consider 
most appropriate); see also Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts 
and Rules in Public International Law 367 (2008) (highlighting the insufficiencies of 
the systemic integration method of interpretation, since “integration relates to a result, while 
interpretation methods definitionally relate to methods and means”). 
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objective per se, a common necessity for the whole international com-
munity. According to the logic underlying systemic integration, the aim 
and purpose pursued by a given norm of international law can only be 
realized as long as and to the extent that its effect will not fragment in-
ternational law. Granting Article 31(3)(c) de facto primacy above other 
methods of interpretation thus seeks to guarantee that fragmentation will 
be avoided.35 Moreover, attribution of a particular priority to the objec-
tives pursued by systemic integration implies that the teleology pursued 
by another norm of international law can achieve its effet utile only to 
the extent that it does not impede the unity of international law. The up-
grading of Article 31(3)(c) from one simple interpretative method among 
others to a principle of international law or a constitutional norm can 
thus only be explained as a reaction—the (self-)defense of a system 
threatened to explode into compartmentalized pieces. 
However, in spite of its openly pro-international legal order orienta-
tion, this approach reveals profound self-awareness. Rather than using 
the contiguous term of systematic interpretation,36 which is a well-known 
technique within municipal law, the ILC christens this tool of interpreta-
tion with the name of “systemic integration,” which has two 
implications. In addition to implying that special international law is, by 
means of interpretation, harmonically integrated within the general sys-
tem, it also suggests that, thanks to a process of harmonious integration, 
the system of international law is becoming more complete, firm, com-
pact, and uniform—or, in a word, integrated. The decentralized nature of 
the international legal order, its imperfect institutionalization, the ab-
sence of objectivity, and the dominance of sovereign bilateralism all 
render it a system which is immature and frequently ineffective. Thus, 
the teleology of Article 31(3)(c) cannot be limited to the simple preser-
vation of the system’s integrity; it follows that the article should also 
make a positive contribution towards its further integration. The term 
“systemic integration” is thus not static—it calls for evolution. 
That said, that Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT was originally intended37 
to serve as a means by which to foster the inter-temporal rejuvenation of 
                                                                                                                      
 35. Contra Isabelle Van Damme, Some Observations About the ILC Study Group Re-
port on the Fragmentation of International Law: WTO Treaty Interpretation Against the 
Background of Other International Law, 2006 Finnish Y.B. Int’l L. 21, 27 (arguing that the 
aim of ILC was to clarify rather than to suggest priority in the application of Article 31(3)(c)).  
 36. See Dictionnaire de droit international public 607 (Jean Salmon ed., 2001) 
(describing systemic interpretation in international law as a method of interpretation, making 
reference to the whole institutional and normative organization of the international commu-
nity). 
 37. For a thorough analytical overview of the drafting history of Article 31(3)(c) within 
the ILC and beyond, see Panos Merkouris, Debating the Ouroboros of International Law: The 
Drafting History of Article 31(3)(c), 9 Int’l Community L. Rev. 1 (2007). 
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treaty provisions comes as no surprise.38 As its travaux préparatoires39 
show, the issue was debated in great depth and the initial version of the 
document—which provided that treaties should be interpreted in the 
light of the law in force at the time of their drafting—was abandoned. By 
leaving out the Fitzmaurician principle of contemporaneity, the final ver-
sion of the VCLT managed to omit the temporal factor. What was finally 
decided was “to transfer this element of interpretation to paragraph 3 [of 
Article 31] as being an element which is extrinsic both to the text and to 
the ‘context.’ ”40 That is, although the reference in subparagraph (3)(c) to 
“any relevant rules of international law” is less explicit, it seems wide 
enough to embrace those norms that were not applicable at the time of 
conclusion of a treaty.41 Subsequent developments that were not initially 
envisaged by the parties42 can thus, by way of Article 31(3)(c), be inte-
grated into a judge’s rationale and therefore become applicable at the 
time of interpretation.43  
Yet, the idea of interpreting a special instrument in light of the evo-
lution taking place within the broader international legal order is 
reminiscent of another interpretative method. Inter-temporality is insepa-
rably linked to the dynamic or evolutive (the two terms treated in this 
Article as synonymous) method of interpretation, which calls for the in-
terpretation of a norm in accordance with any evolution that occurred 
                                                                                                                      
 38. See Richard K. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation 251–56 (2008). 
 39. See The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Travaux Préparato-
ries 244–49 (Dietrich Rauschning ed., 1978) [hereinafter VCLT Travaux Préparatoires]; 
see also Jan Klabbers, Reluctant Grundnormen: Articles 31(3)(c) and 42 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties and the Fragmentation of International Law, in Time, History 
and International Law 141, 143–48 (58 Developments in International Law, Matthew 
Craven et al. eds., 2007) (providing a very comprehensive review of the drafting history of 
Article 31(3)(c)). 
 40. VCLT Travaux Préparatoires, supra note 39, at 254. 
 41. Francis G. Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Special 
Reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna Diplomatic Con-
ference, 18 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 318, 330 (1969). 
 42. See Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 140 (2d 
ed. 1973) (insisting that it “must always be on condition that such an evolutionary interpreta-
tion does not conflict with the intentions and expectations of the parties as they may have been 
expressed during the negotiations preceding the conclusion of the treaty”). The accent is 
placed clearly onto the volonté of the contracting parties. See id. But see V. Crnic-Grotic, Ob-
ject and Purpose of Treaties in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1997 Asian Y.B. 
Int’l L. 141, 165 (explaining that the evolutive interpretation is understood as a method “sat-
isfying new needs which were not foreseen originally by the parties” and falls under the 
broader teleological technique of interpretation) (citation omitted). 
 43. See Sinclair, supra note 42, at 139 (arguing that “a treaty may retain in force for 
many years, and . . . international law may evolve and develop during the period when the 
treaty is in force” and that “[t]here is some evidence that the evolution and development of 
international law may exercise a decisive influence on the meaning to be given to expressions 
incorporated in a treaty, particularly if these expressions themselves denote relative or evolv-
ing notions”). 
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within the court’s respective legal system since the enactment of the 
norm.
44
 
Thus, one could argue that Article 31(3)(c) is much more than an 
apparatus enabling the interpreter of a special instrumentum of interna-
tional law to read its norms in light of third (that is to say, extraneous) 
relevant sources—stemming from both general45 and inter-subjective or 
special46 international law. While definitely offering this option, Article 
31(3)(c) does so in a broader, inter-temporal frame. Hence, the interpre-
tation of a treaty “cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent 
development of law” and “has to be interpreted and applied within the 
framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the inter-
pretation.”47 Again, a treaty “is not static, and is open to adapt to 
emerging norms of international law.”48 
Nonetheless, to be fair to the ILC, one must recognize that its report, 
which apparently calls a well-known tool (dynamic or evolutive method 
of interpretation) by a new name (systemic integration technique), it 
makes special reference to the inter-temporal dimension of Article 
31(3)(c).49 However, the ILC has chosen to examine the inter-temporality 
                                                                                                                      
 44. See the similar definition provided by the Dictionnaire de droit international 
public, supra note 36, at 605. As Jean Marc Sorel explains, most of the time, the other inter-
pretative techniques are proven to be sufficient and, therefore, reference to general 
international law by the means of Article 31(3)(c) becomes pertinent mostly for the purposes 
of dynamic interpretation, which aims to take into account the evolution of international law 
in general. Sorel, supra note 8, at 1323. 
 45. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 182 (Nov. 6) (refusing to accept, 
after making explicit reference to Article 31(3)(c), that the bilateral treaty between two ad-
verse parties “was intended to operate wholly independently of the relevant rules of 
international law on the use of force” and holding that “[t]he application of the relevant rules 
of international law relating to this question . . . forms an integral part of the task of interpreta-
tion entrusted to the Court”). 
 46. See Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), 2008 
I.C.J. 37 (June 4), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/136/14550.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2010). The court resorted to Article 31(3)(c) in order to refer to an old bilateral treaty 
of friendship between Djibouti and France. Id. ¶¶ 112–14. The convention over which the 
dispute between these two states arose was interpreted in the light of that treaty of friendship. 
Id. 
 47. Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opi-
nion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 32–33 (June 21). 
 48. Gabcίkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 68 (Sept. 25). Nev-
ertheless, it is important to mention that the court applied the dynamic method of 
interpretation only after having established that doing so was within the intentions of the par-
ties to the treaty—that is, “by inserting . . . evolving provisions in the Treaty, the parties 
recognized the potential necessity to adapt the Project.” Id. at 67. 
 49. ILC, Report of the International Law Commission, ¶ 251(4)(22), U.N. Doc. A/61/10 
(Oct. 1, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 ILC Report] (“International law is a dynamic legal system. A 
treaty may convey whether in applying Article 31(3)(c) the interpreter should refer only to 
rules of international law in force at the time of the conclusion of the treaty or may also take 
into account subsequent changes in the law. Moreover, the meaning of a treaty provision may 
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issue as a “special question”50 of systemic integration. This choice would 
appear to reveal the ILC’s understanding about the relationship between 
the two methods of interpretation: it seems to conceive of the dynamism 
of the international system in evolving towards deeper integration as an 
exclusively unidirectional process. Special regimes are meant to be in-
terpreted in light of international law so that their effects are in harmony 
with the system of the latter. Otherwise they risk contributing to frag-
mentation and thus impede further integration. According to this 
approach, because of the risk of fragmentation, a stop should be put to 
any forces of evolution stemming from the special regimes or from nor-
mative systems other than the international one that might possibly affect 
these special regimes. By the same token, the evolution that derives from 
the special regimes’ practice has to be deprived of any potential to affect 
the already crystallized norms of general international law. For Article 
31(3)(c) to successfully promote systemic integration during diachronic 
evolution of the normative environment without allowing fragmentation, 
the systemic center must be either robust enough to remain intact despite 
changes taking place within special regimes (which would mean that 
fragmentation was a non-issue) or else static and therefore, by definition, 
unaffected by such changes. As we all know very well, this is not the 
case of international law. 
If we accept that this last point is valid, we must also accept that 
evolutive interpretation may move in the other direction: that is, rather 
than going hand-in-hand with systemic integration, the evolut-
ive/dynamic technique may also be proven (if evolution originates 
“inland” from the specialized regimes) to cause (temporary) fragmenta-
tion. If this is right, then these two techniques of interpretation may 
theoretically both diverge and converge. Yet it is only in the scenario of 
convergence that Article 31(3)(c) indeed operates, as the title of this 
chapter suggests, as a servitore di due padroni. This is a presumption 
that should be tested in the case law of the ECtHR. However, before en-
gaging in this intellectual exercise, it is important to offer an overview of 
the specialty of the ECHR and of the margin of discretion recognized to 
its interpreters either to place emphasis on the sui generis socio-
normative nature of its teleology or to proceed with a less constitutional 
reading and, thereby, to give priority to the (highly voluntarist) economy 
of the international legal system within which the Convention is situated. 
                                                                                                                      
also be affected by subsequent developments, especially where there are subsequent develop-
ments in customary law and general principles of law.”). 
 50. ILC, Final Report on Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 28, ¶¶ 461, 
475–78. 
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II. Interpreting the ECHR: Pluralism 
Within a Dualist Décor 
A. The Dualist Confines of Pluralism in the Means of Interpretation 
As has been ingeniously suggested, treaty interpretation appeals to 
the spirit of finesse more than to the spirit of geometry.51 The contrast 
between these two concepts is strong and the message for the judge quite 
clear. Selectivity in methods of interpretation, although forbidden by the 
strict rules of geometry, is acceptable when necessary to a particular out-
come. All the same, even when a judge aspires to interpret subtly, she 
does not have carte blanche in doing so. Much as deviating from geo-
metric rules may result in mistaken conclusions, dexterous approaches to 
interpreting legal documents may be over-fussy, if not downright clum-
sy; the legitimacy of the interpretation can ultimately be assessed only 
by the final result—that is, whether this result is just and reasonable. 
If it is accepted that a judge possesses a right (competence) to make 
judicial choices, she “cannot be regarded as having a purely neutral role 
as discoverer and enforcer of the law but as being an active participant.”52 
This notion of choice arms the judge with considerable liberty of action 
both to self-restrain her powers, as long as this does not end up in a de-
nial of justice, and to move beyond the letter of the law, as long as this 
does not result in judicial activism in the sense of a metamorphosis of 
the norm. All the same, the concepts of both denial of justice and activ-
ism are substantially vague and broad, leading inevitably to subjective 
opinions on whether judicial interpretation respects the limits set by 
these two extremes. The dividing line between legislating and adjudicat-
ing is always fine. Without entering into a discussion of the definition of 
these concepts, the thesis promoted by this Article is that, within the fra-
gile boundaries of judicial competence, each and every judge is free to 
select the reasoning that seems to her most appropriate and persuasive in 
order to support the outcome that both the law and her conscience sug-
gest in a given moment, with reference to the particular social 
environment that gave birth to the conflict. Consequently, judicial discre-
tion includes both the final outcome of the decision as well as the means 
for its support. It also implies the existence of pluralism among interpre-
tative tools, not all of which necessarily produce identical solutions. 
Hence, a judge demonstrates selectiveness when she excludes those tools 
                                                                                                                      
 51. Patrick Daillier & Alain Pellet, Droit international public 264 (7th ed. 
2002). 
 52. Paul Mahoney, Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the European Court 
of Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin, 11 Hum. Rts. L.J. 57, 60 (1990). 
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that do not support the outcome that she considers just or that do not pro-
mote the values, objectives, or necessities to which she gives priority. 
Focusing then on the example of the ECtHR, the Strasbourg Court 
often integrates in its reasoning “different arguments . . . read in [such] a 
way that they are channeled toward a common interpretation.”53 These 
diverse arguments, corresponding to respective interpretative techniques 
that have been selected among other available ones, are employed in a 
cumulative and converging way, so that the court’s judgment presents the 
fullest possible justification. In order for the ECtHR to implement this 
kind of pluralistic interpretative operation, it makes use of a toolbox con-
taining a set of both the well-known methods (the classic international 
law interpretative tools) and certain others specific to its regime.54  
The point of departure for judicial interpretation can be none other 
than the law, that is, the text of the ECHR. A textual analysis focuses on 
the wording of the Convention and aims at investigating the literal mean-
ing of its language.55 Self-evidently, this technique is closely related to a 
second technique, which focuses on the will of contracting parties.56 The 
ECHR negotium, as reflected in the text of the Convention, is the product 
of the volonté of its signatory parties. Since its normativity stems from 
state will, voluntarist positivism requires that the Convention neither be 
given an effect against this volonté, nor produce results that were origi-
nally meant to be excluded. Thus reference to its travaux préparatoires 
may prove particularly helpful in shedding light on the original inten-
tions of the parties.57 
                                                                                                                      
 53. Mark Toufayan, “Human Rights,” “Speciality” in Interpretation and the Anxieties 
of Violence 34 (2005) (on file with author); see also Mark Toufayan, Human Rights Treaty 
Interpretation: A Postmodern Account of Its Claim to “Specialty”, at iii (Ctr. Hum. Rts. & 
Global Justice, Working Paper No. 2, 2005), available at http://www.chrgj.org/publications/ 
docs/wp/0502%20Toufayan.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Toufayan, Human 
Rights Treaty Interpretation] (providing a shorter version of Toufayan’s study).  
 54. See the classification of the methods of interpretation of the ECtHR proposed by 
Olivier De Schutter, L’Interprétation de la Convention Européenne des Droits de L’Homme: 
Un Essai en Demolition, 70 Revue de Droit International de Sciences Diplomatiques 
et Politiques 83 (1992). 
 55. See, for example, the argument that the court made concerning the question of 
euthanasia in Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002–III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, 186 (holding that the right 
to life “cannot, without a distortion of language, be interpreted as conferring the diametrically 
opposite right, namely a right to die”). 
 56. See, e.g., Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30 (1979) 
(holding that “[i]t would clearly be contrary to the intention of the drafters of the Convention 
to hold that a restriction imposed by virtue of the common law is not ‘prescribed by law’ on 
the sole ground that it is not enunciated in legislation”). 
 57. See, e.g., James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 14, 39–40 (1986) 
(“Confronted with a text whose interpretation has given rise to such disagreement, the Court 
considers it proper to have recourse to the travaux préparatoires as a supplementary means of 
interpretation.”). 
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Moreover, nothing prevents the court from “delegating” its authority 
as ultimate interpreter of the Convention to national courts, allowing 
them to exercise a margin of appreciation58 to define a term of the Con-
vention at the domestic level, in accordance with the premises, legal 
traditions, sensitivities, and particular values dominant within the respec-
tive national legal orders. In so doing, there is a strong presumption that 
a national judge is not only better situated to translate, through case law, 
the prevailing societal understanding over a given question of human 
rights protection at any given moment, but also that, since her state’s 
courts form part of a particular democratic society and its legal order, 
she is better positioned to construe the current majoritarian will of its 
executive.  
Against the voluntarist reading of the Convention, one can juxtapose 
the constitutional, or objectivist, interpretation and the plethora of means 
that an ECtHR judge possesses that allows the ECHR to effectuate its 
humanistic and integrational objectives. If the advantages of the margin 
of appreciation method are flexibility, pluralism, and respect for the par-
ticularities of different societies, the aim of the diametrically opposite 
technique—that is, autonomous interpretation59—is to ensure that cul-
tural diversity and polyphony will not turn the European public order 
into Babel. Within the European sub-system, the tempo is set by the 
judges of Strasbourg. Thus, it is for these latter to choose when a term of 
the Convention should be given one single pan-European definition, irre-
spective of the content that it was given by domestic courts. For the 
ECHR to successfully establish common standards of human rights pro-
tection, consolidate its public order, and speak with one single voice to 
all the domestic orders of its signatory parties, its lexicon must be uni-
fied, common, and distinctive. Besides, the ECHR regime itself 
corresponds to an integrated and highly centralized system and, as such, 
it can only accommodate polyphony to the extent that this does not 
threaten to fragment it.  
Going beyond the objective of uniformity, one interesting argument 
in favor of an ECtHR as “ultimate interpreter” of the ECHR is that, like 
all others, European society is subject to evolution. Although in doing so 
                                                                                                                      
 58. See, e.g., Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30 (1986). This 
case concerned whether the respondent state had an obligation to adopt positive measures 
conferring on the applicant, a transsexual, legal status corresponding to his new sexual iden-
tity. Recognizing that, in the absence of consensus on the issue, states enjoy a “wide margin of 
appreciation” to regulate this type of question at the domestic level, the ECtHR abstained from 
drawing a common standard at pan-European level and rather granted states the competence to 
regulate and/or adjudicate the issue at the domestic level. Id. 
 59. See Öztürk v. Germany, 73 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1984); Engel v. Nether-
lands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1976). 
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it evidently risks diluting the original will of states,60 the court often re-
calls that the Convention is a “living instrument which must be 
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.”61 Given the dual na-
ture of the ECHR as a classic international treaty and a special 
instrument for the establishment and further integration of a regional 
public order, these present-day conditions may well take into account the 
socio-normative evolution occurring within both62 the international legal 
order (through Article 31(3)(c) VCLT)63 and the domestic orders of the 
member states.64 
The juxtaposition of the various available methods of interpretation 
could continue to follow the same antithetic schema and to evidence the 
fact that the ECtHR is perfectly able both to maintain the original will of 
the contracting parties65 and to diverge from it. The reason for divergence 
would have remained unclear had the Strasbourg Court not highlighted 
the special aim and purpose of the ECHR and suggested that it was its 
drafters’ intention to endow it with such a telos.66 The character of the 
Convention resembles that of a “constitutional instrument of European 
public order.”67 Due, finally, to its special nature,68 the ECHR telos re-
                                                                                                                      
 60. Cf. Frédéric Sudre, À Propos du Dynamisme Interprétatif de la Cour Européenne 
des Droits de l’Homme, 28 La Semaine Juridique Édition Générale 1365 (July 11, 2001) 
(arguing that the evolutive method of interpretation depends in reality on states’ consent). 
Thus, according to Sudre, the truly “dynamic” reading of the ECHR relies primarily on meth-
ods of interpretation other than the “consensual-evolutive” one. 
 61. Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1995) (decision on the prelimi-
nary objections). 
 62. Ramona Toma, La réalité judiciaire de la Cour européenne des droits de 
l’homme: Activisme et retenue judiciaires 56–61 (2003). 
 63. See the case law presented in Part III.A.1, infra. 
 64. See, e.g., Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 15–16 (1978) (judgment on 
the merits) (“In the case now before it the Court cannot but be influenced by the developments 
and commonly accepted standards in the penal policy of member States . . . in this field.”). 
 65. See George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights 58–72 (2007) (objecting to the voluntarist reading of the 
Convention, which the author defines as “intentionalism”).  
 66. Hence, since “[i]t is clear from the Preamble to the Convention that the High Con-
tracting Parties in concluding the Convention intended . . . to take steps for the collective 
enforcement of the rights and . . . that the purpose . . . was ‘to establish a common public order 
of the free democracies of Europe,’ ” its teleology cannot be other than the effective protection 
of the rights it enumerates. Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou & Loizidou v. Turkey, App. 
Nos. 15299/89, 15300/89, 15318/89, 68 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 216, 241–42, ¶ 20 
(1991) (decision as to the admissibility) (quoting Austria v. Italy, 1961 Y.B. Eur. Conv. H.R. 
116, 138 (Eur. Comm’n H.R.)). 
 67. Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou, & Loizidou, 68 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 
at 242; Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1995) decision on the preliminary 
objections). 
 68. The ECtHR started building the idea of an international instrumentum of special 
character in its very early judgments. See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) 5, 90 (1978) (“Unlike international treaties of the classical kind, the Convention com-
prises more than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting States. It creates, over and 
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quires that it guarantee “rights that are practical and effective”69 (that is, 
it must fulfill the principle of effectiveness, or the effet utile). 
B. The Dualist Confines of the Special Nature of the ECHR 
The ECHR’s specialty, as argued in the introduction of this Article, 
is multi-level. In the first instance, the Convention is special in the sense 
that its norms are deprived of general effect. Being signed and ratified by 
a closed number of states, its normativity is relative, that is, it is inter-
subjective. However, it is on the second level of specialty that the ECtHR 
relies in order to nourish its human rights teleology and, in the name of 
the effectiveness of rights protection, often ranks other conflicting objec-
tives lower, including sometimes the objective of systemic integration. 
The ECHR is a special international treaty in that it protects the dignity-
stemming rights of the human being. It defends interests which are 
common to its signatory parties and not exclusive to each of them sepa-
rately. In support of the idea of a special instrumentum that is at the 
service of certain common values ranked of greater importance to a par-
ticular social group, general international law offers to the substantive 
norms created by such a treaty an equally special, distinct, if not virtu-
ally hierarchically70 superior normative status. 
The human rights provisions of the ECHR introduce objective obli-
gations which are owed erga omnes partes and, in so doing, the 
provisions establish a community of interests, the safeguarding of which 
falls under the common responsibility of all states parties. With its 2006 
final Report on Fragmentation of International Law, the ILC classified 
the categories of erga omnes and erga omnes partes norms next to that 
of jus cogens and examined all three under the general heading of “rela-
tions of importance.”71 However, the conclusion it reached was that  
                                                                                                                      
above a network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations which, in the words 
of the Preamble, benefit from a ‘collective enforcement.’ ”). 
 69. E.g., S. v. Switzerland, 220 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1991). The origins of the 
principle of effectiveness can be found in Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979). 
Ever since, the principle has served as the basis for building a pro homine case law on a num-
ber of issues, including the positive or quasi-horizontal effect of the ECHR.  
 70. One cannot but refer to the famous paper by Prosper Weil criticizing the danger of 
the “erosion” of “classic” international law by the “new” trends of, inter alia, jus cogens and 
erga omnes. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 413 (1983). Among several other works on the hierarchy of norms, see Juan Antonio 
Carrillo Salcedo, Reflections on the Existence of a Hierarchy in International Law, 8 Eur. J. 
Int’l L. 583 (1997); J.H.H. Weiler & Andreas L. Paulus, The Structure of Change in Interna-
tional Law or Is There a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law?, 8 Eur. J. Int’l L. 545 
(1997). 
 71. ILC, Final Report on Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 28, ¶¶ 324–
409. 
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[o]bligations erga omnes are different from Article 103 of the 
United Nations Charter and jus cogens. Whereas the latter are 
distinguished by their normative power—their ability to override 
a conflicting norm—obligations erga omnes designate the scope 
of application of the relevant law, and the procedural conse-
quences that follow from this. . . . The erga omnes nature of an 
obligation . . . indicates no clear superiority of that obligation 
over other obligations. Although in practice norms recognized as 
having an erga omnes validity set up undoubtedly important ob-
ligations, this importance does not translate into a hierarchical 
superiority similar to that of Article 103 and jus cogens.”72 
Thus, the ILC considered it important to emphasize 
the clear difference that exists between jus cogens norms and ob-
ligations as erga omnes. The former have to do with the 
normative “weight” of a norm, the latter with its procedural 
“scope.” While a jus cogens norm has necessarily an erga omnes 
scope, not all erga omnes obligations have weight as jus co-
gens.73 
However, the counter-argument against such a conservative approach 
highlights that the principal procedural consequences of the erga omnes 
and, mutatis mutandis, erga omnes partes norms,74 described by the ILC 
as the procedural scope of application, are not a “scope”, that is to say an 
objective per se; after all, that procedural effect is not born ex nihilo but 
rather is a rational, self-operative consequence stemming from the fact 
that these norms—by definition—incorporate values ranked of high im-
portance by the international community. The reason indeed why these 
obligations are owed erga omnes (and thereby require collective en-
forcement) is because they incorporate values bearing substantial moral 
                                                                                                                      
 72. Id. ¶ 380. 
 73. Id. ¶ 408. 
 74. See ILC, Draft Resolution: Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, art. 48(1), U.N. Doc. A/C.6/56/L.20 (Nov. 12, 2001) [hereinafter ILC Norms on State 
Responsibility]. The Resolution provides: 
Invocation of responsibility by a State other than an injured State:  
1. Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of 
another State in accordance with paragraph 2 if: (a) The obligation breached is 
owed to a group of States including that State, and is established for the protection 
of a collective interest of the group; or (b) the obligation breached is owed to the in-
ternational community as a whole. 
Id. 
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weight for the community as a whole.75 Recognizing this, this Article 
argues that the material scope—and not the procedural consequences—
of the value-stemming objectives promoted by the erga omnes norms 
call for the recognition of their normative superiority vis-à-vis the classic 
bilateral or bilateralizable norms of international law. 
However, the effect of the primacy described here does not mirror 
that of jus cogens; erga omnes norms are neither absolute nor non-
derogable. Moreover, they cannot generate the nullifying effect of per-
emptory norms. The normative weight of erga omnes obligations simply 
implies that priority should be given to their fulfillment. However, if a 
non-erga omnes norm conflicted with an erga omnes norm, the norma-
tive force of each would remain intact in abstracto, but the first would be 
allowed to produce its results only to the extent that it did not dispropor-
tionately impede the effect of the erga omnes obligation. Unlike jus 
cogens, erga omnes norms are susceptible to exceptions and limita-
tions;76 however, these exceptions and limitations are allowed on the 
precondition that they respect the exigencies of proportionality. The role 
of this precondition is central to priority setting, to the balancing of con-
flicting objectives, and to measuring the extent to which the effect of a 
given erga omnes norm may be limited. The legality of the limitations is 
to be decided ad hoc, after taking into account the context and the par-
ticular circumstances of each case.  
Finally, even if one wanted to follow the ILC’s procedural approach 
and neglect the material dimension of the erga omnes norms, it would be 
difficult to imagine how two states’ (bilateral) law-making powers could 
supersede obligations they owe vis-à-vis a much broader circle of sub-
jects—unless of course their bilateral (or bilateralizable) results were not 
per se incompatible with or disproportionate to their erga omnes obliga-
tions. 
                                                                                                                      
 75. See Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 Am. J. Int’l L. 
318 (2006) (arguing that “obligations erga omnes have specific and broad procedural conse-
quences because of the substantive importance of the norms they enunciate”); see also 
Questions Relating to Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.) (Order of May 28, 
2009) (Trindade, J., dissenting), ¶ 71, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/ 
15154.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2010) (emphasizing the values protected by obligations erga 
omnes as the source of their special status); Maurizio Ragazzi, The Concept of Interna-
tional Obligations Erga Omnes 202–03 (1997). Contra Alain Pellet, Conclusions, in The 
Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order 418 (Christian Tomuschat & 
Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006); Ian D. Seiderman, Hierarchy in International Law: 
The Human Rights Dimension 125 (2001). 
 76. See Pieter van Dijk, The Status of International Treaties on Human Rights: The 
Hierarchy of Rules of International Law, Venice Commission, in The Status of Interna-
tional Treaties on Human Rights 222–24 (2006) (contending that both erga omnes and 
jus cogens have a higher rank than other rules of international law and, unlike jus cogens, 
obligations erga omnes are not absolute, but contain an “absolute core”). 
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The ECHR is, therefore, as “special” as any other human rights trea-
ty that establishes obligations erga omnes partes that reflect values 
common to all of its contracting parties. The substantive international 
obligations deriving from it are owed vis-à-vis the whole community of 
parties and the safeguarding of their material content falls under com-
mon responsibility. Due to its erga omnes partes nature the ECHR 
recognizes the legitimate interest of each and every state party in react-
ing to violations, regardless of whether it is directly affected by the 
breach.77 Intentionally designed as a non-synallagmatic agreement, the 
ECHR squarely excludes reciprocity. Last but not least, as a conse-
quence of these special characteristics and, mainly, due to the material 
humanistic scope of its provisions, the Convention’s substantive provi-
sions require that a certain (non-absolute) priority be given to their 
fulfillment, as against other conflicting bilateral or bilateralizable obliga-
tions. 
The ECHR’s specialty is not, however, limited only to the normative 
quality of its substantive provisions. At the third and last level, its special 
normative effects are expected to be produced within an equally special 
socio-political context. If general international law is the matrix which 
gave birth to the ECHR, the European continent is the arena in which it 
produces its effect and the idea of European integration is its raison 
d’être. The geographical, economic, social, and political confines of Eu-
rope—a social unit marked by the bitter experiences of its past and 
inspired by a common understanding of certain values—delimit not only 
its normative, but primarily its practical and effective limits. Within this 
space, the ECHR functions as an instrument of constitutional weight, 
designed for the anthropocentric integration of a rather homogeneous 
regional group, which despite its inherent diversity is far more integrated 
and compact than the broader universal system. 
Certainly, pluralism in its methods of interpretation has neither ex-
cluded nor precluded “the emergence of a specific ‘human rights ethos’ 
or even a ‘European human rights tradition’ ”78 elevated to a European 
public order. Equally, however, it cannot be argued that pluralism alone 
guarantees balance between the “musts” of a document reflecting the 
logic of a human rights regional quasi-constitution and the “oughts” of a 
multilateral treaty forming part and parcel of international law. At the 
same time, neither does pluralism prohibit such a balance. Thus, no mat-
ter how rich the interpretative arsenal of an ECtHR judge is, she is 
                                                                                                                      
 77. “Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged breach of the pro-
visions of the Convention and the protocols thereto by another High Contracting Party.” 
ECHR, supra note 3, art. 33; see ILC Norms on State Responsibility, supra note 74, art. 
48(1)(a). 
 78. Toufayan, Human Rights Treaty Interpretation, supra note 53, at 21. 
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forced to adapt its use to the logic, conditions, and exigencies of the du-
alist nature of the ECHR, which can be schematized by the following 
three antithetic ideas: (1) subjective will of the states versus objective 
pro homine telos; (2) integration of the Convention into the broader in-
ternational system versus the constitutional specialty of its regional 
system; and (3) integration of the broader international system versus the 
integration of the European public order.  
Having dealt with this, the way is now open to examine how Article 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT takes effect within the confines of this contradic-
tory, multidimensional, dualistic décor. 
III. The Use of Article 31(3)(c) in 
ECtHR Case Law 
Having concluded the theoretical part of the study, the section that 
follows is devoted to an analysis of the practice of the ECtHR, with the 
aim of testing the validity of the presumptions that have been outlined so 
far. It goes without saying that although, in principle, the court proceeds 
proprio motu in controlling the suitability of the systemic integration 
method of interpretation (or, as this Article argues, selects it79 among the 
other interpretive techniques available), there is nothing to prevent the 
                                                                                                                      
 79. See, e.g., Andrejeva v. Latvia, App. No. 55707/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 18, 2009) 
(Ziemele, partly dissenting) ¶¶ 15–17. In this interesting partial dissent, Judge Ziemele ac-
cuses the court of applying the Convention “in isolation from international law.” Id. The 
applicant, no longer a citizen of any state, alleged that the respondent state had discriminated 
against her in refusing to grant her a pension for her employment in the former Soviet Union 
prior to 1991 on the ground that she did not have Latvian citizenship. According to Judge 
Ziemele, the court should have first determined—through systemic integration—whether, in 
terms of international law, the respondent state succeeded or not to the obligations of the So-
viet Union in the field of social rights. Id. ¶¶ 17–21. Apparently, for Judge Ziemele, the 
answer to this question constituted a preliminary condition for the Convention to apply. Never-
theless, although admittedly not as explicitly as could be desirable, the court made a very 
strong point concerning its refusal to resort to the norms of international law over state succes-
sion. According to its argument, even assuming that the respondent state did not succeed the 
former Soviet Union as to this specific obligation, “the conclusion that has to be drawn in this 
case would be unaffected: where a State decides of its own accord to pay pensions to indi-
viduals in respect of periods of employment outside its territory, thereby creating a sufficiently 
clear legal basis in its domestic law, the presumed entitlement to such benefits falls within the 
scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.” Id. ¶ 78 (judgment). Hence, while international law did 
not require the respondent state to grant a pension to the applicant for her work under the 
Soviet regime, once it had decided unilaterally and voluntarily to provide pension to individu-
als under its jurisdiction, it had to do so non-discriminatorily. Id. ¶ 90. The legal basis for the 
applicant’s entitlement finds its source in domestic law. Yet, interpreted in the light of the 
European public order, this entitlement acquires the effect of a “quasi-unilateral act.” 
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parties to the conflict from calling for an interpretation of the Conven-
tion in the light of the norms of international law relevant to their case.80  
This Article argues that this case law can be classified by the role 
that ECtHR judges have given to Article 31(3(c) with regard to the 
standing of ECHR norms vis-à-vis the broader system into which they 
are expected to harmonically integrate. The suggested taxonomy requires 
assessing the use of Article 31(3)(c) at two levels: (A) its effect on nor-
mative aspects of systemic integration, and (B) this effect on institutional 
aspects of systemic integration.  
Within this first categorization, further analysis is necessary: the Ar-
ticle argues in Part III.A that there are three distinct scenarios in which 
the ECtHR might use Article 31(3)(c), including when: 
(1) the norms of the ECHR are complementary to the extraneous 
relevant norms of international law;  
(2) the Conventions’ norms conflict with other norms of interna-
tional law; and 
(3) the norms of international law are ratione materiae irrelevant 
to the ECHR subject matter, and are such that the ECtHR 
must resort to in order to answer a preliminary question that is 
necessary for its regime to produce effects. 
                                                                                                                      
 80. For examples of cases in which the parties invoked Article 31(3)(c) on their own 
initiative, see, inter alia Markovic v. Italy, App. No. 1398/03, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52, 1045, 
1078 (2007). In this case, the court had to decide whether there had been a violation of the 
right of access to justice (Article 6 of the ECHR). The applicants, victims of the use of force 
by NATO against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, alleged that they had suffered a 
denial of justice when Italy refused to examine on the merits Applicant’s tort action for dam-
ages under international and domestic law. Id. ¶ 100. In order for the ECtHR to decide 
whether the respondent state violated the right of access to justice, it first had to decide 
whether the international law norms on which the applicants founded their claim for repara-
tion supported such an action. Id. ¶¶ 100–02, 108–09. The validation of the domestic courts’ 
practice came only after the court proceeded with its own interpretation of these international 
norms. Id. ¶ 109. This case would be classified in the third of the categories discussed later in 
this Article (those that resort to international law for preliminary questions of applicability of 
the ECHR). See also Carlson v. Switzerland, App. No. 49492/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 6, 2008) 
(judgment on the merits). This case concerned child abduction. While alleging a violation of 
his right to family life under Article 8 of the ECHR, the applicant called on the court to inter-
pret Article 8 in light of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98. Id. ¶ 57–60. Via Article 
31(3)(c), the court introduced the named Hague Convention into its reasoning, and read Arti-
cle 8 of the ECHR in the light of its provisions. Id. ¶ 69–82. Interestingly, certain parts of the 
court’s judgment give the impression that, by incorporating the Hague Convention into Article 
8, it applied the Hague Convention in substance. The application of the systemic integration 
technique in Carlson would fall into the first of the three categories proposed in this Article 
(complementary norms).  
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For the Article to be consistent with the questions that have been 
raised in the introduction81 and with the consequent presumptions that 
were released in Parts I and II, it must investigate the role of Article 
31(3)(c) not only as an anti-fragmentation tool but also as a mechanism 
enabling the evolutive (dynamic) reading of the ECHR. As Part III.A 
explains, theoretically Article 31(3)(c) may be used evolutionarily in 
each of the three aforementioned normative scenarios, that is, in the face 
of complementarity, conflict of norms, and preliminary questions falling 
outside the ECHR’s subject matter: under this hypothesis, the dynamic 
interpretation falls into the broader scope of systemic integration, the 
two methods converge and the latter absorbs the former. However, the 
empirical data collected from the case law of the ECtHR suggest that, in 
fact, the court relies (both tacitly and explicitly) on the dy-
namic/evolutive dimension of Article 31(3)(c) only in the first 
scenario—that is, only when there is complementarity between ECHR 
and extraneous norms. As such, the method of dynamic interpretation is 
juxtaposed against that of systemic integration only in cases in which 
norms are complementary. What will be demonstrated is that systemic 
integration and evolutive interpretative approaches both converge and 
diverge.  
Nevertheless, the three scenarios that cover potential systemic inte-
gration of normative aspects through ECtHR case law must be 
distinguished from those involved at the second level, concerning poten-
tial institutional fragmentation. Part III.B discusses the rather sui 
generis, so far exceptional, and arguably abusive role that the ECtHR has 
assigned to Article 31(3)(c) in inhibiting institutional fragmentation in 
cases presenting characteristics of a prevailingly institutional and non-
normative consistency. Of course, the classifications proposed here do 
not claim to be exhaustive or absolute. 
A. Normative Aspects 
1. The Complementary Role of International Law: 
Pseudo-Systemic Integration? 
In assessing the effect of Article 31(3)(c) as an anti-fragmentation 
tool, the first scenario to be examined is the ECtHR’s introduction into 
its reasoning—by way of Article 31(3)(c)—of extraneous and relevant 
norms of international law that are ratione materiae complementary to 
                                                                                                                      
81. Those include, to recall: (1) How effective can Article 31(3)(c) be as a remedy against 
the fragmentation of international law? (2) To what extent may the Article accommodate tech-
niques of interpretation other than that of systemic integration? And (3), how should the 
relationship between these distinct interpretative methods be conceptualized? 
TZEVELEKOS FTP  4M.DOC 4/14/2010  11:50 AM 
648 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 31:621 
 
its Convention. Before proceeding with a critical analysis of the relevant 
case law, it worth noting that although the ECtHR appears to apply Arti-
cle 31(3)(c) (explicitly or implicitly) most frequently among 
international courts, the literature discussing this phenomenon is some-
what inadequate. Unsurprisingly, with the exception of some recent 
works,82 most authors83 describe the relevant case law as examples of 
evolutive (dynamic) interpretation and not systemic integration. The 
most plausible explanation for this is that the idea of Article 31(3)(c) in 
the service of the unity of the system was introduced by the ILC only 
very recently.  
Another partial explanation relates to the fact that, as will be shown 
infra, systemic integration and evolutionary techniques arguably often 
pursue contiguous objectives—which also explains the challenges of 
organizing the relevant case law into categories. In this connection, this 
Article argues that when the two techniques of systemic integration for 
the purposes of normative complementarity and evolution converge, the 
sole criteria that determine whether the court classifies a case as one or 
the other are (1) the wording that the court uses and (2) whether or not it 
intends to emphasize the evolution. Obviously, when both methods of 
interpretation are based upon Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, the interest in 
distinguishing them is primarily academic. Yet the fact that the dividing 
line is subtle provides proof that the two techniques, although distinct 
and motivated by different goals, converge and have much in common. 
The analysis that follows concerns the cases where first, the court has 
put the accent on integration, and second, the instances where it empha-
sized evolution.  
a. Emphasizing Integration 
i. Opening the Convention to the Broader System in Order to 
Complement Its “Incomplete” Text: Substantive Aspects 
This section considers the ECtHR’s use of systemic integration in 
instances of complementarity between the ECHR and international law. 
The example par excellence in that category of cases is the famous 
Golder judgment,84 which assessed whether the right to access to justice, 
                                                                                                                      
 82. McLachlan, supra note 34, at 296; see also Gardiner, supra note 38, at 284–85 
(describing the function of Article 31(3)(c) in this category of cases as “[f]illing gaps by refer-
ence to general international law”). 
 83. See, e.g., Giorgio Gaja, Does the European Court of Human Rights Use Its Stated 
Methods of Interpretation?, in 1 Divenire sociale e adeguamento del diritto: Studi in 
onore di Francesco Capotorti 213, 219–20 (1999); Søren C. Prebensen, Evolutive Inter-
pretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, in Protecting Human Rights: The 
European Perspective 1123, 1124–26 (Paul Mahoney et al. eds. 2000). 
 84. Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 5 (1975). 
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although not mentioned expressis verbis, falls within the scope of protec-
tion offered by Article 6 of the ECHR. To support its affirmative reply, 
the ECtHR advanced reasoning that combined several methods of inter-
pretation (text, context, object, and purpose),85 including that of systemic 
integration.86 In so doing, it explicitly referred to Article 31(3)(c) VCLT, 
explaining that 
the principle whereby a civil claim must be capable of being 
submitted to a judge ranks as one of the universally “recog-
nised” fundamental principles of law; the same is true of the 
principle of international law which forbids the denial of justice. 
Article 6 § 1 must be read in the light of these principles.87  
Evidently, Article 6 of the ECHR and the two principles of interna-
tional law to which the court referred are ratione materiae relevant. 
While it is true that the jurisdiction of the ECtHR exclusively concerns 
the Convention and its text, by resorting to Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, 
the court managed to open the treaty to the broader legal system and, 
thereby, to read its text in light of the principles prevailing in this broader 
system. Although the systemic integration function of Article 31(3)(c) in 
the Golder case (presumably) was successful, arguably it operated more 
as a bottom-up than a top-down process, which resulted in the integra-
tion of the international legal order into the ECHR. To explain this 
argument further: while the court prima facie aligned the Convention 
with the general principles of international law and, accordingly, the 
former seemingly evolved in such a way as to integrate harmonically 
within the broader system, integration was not the objective per se of the 
ECtHR. It is clear from the court’s reasoning and its converging, 
cumulative use of several interpretative techniques that the court’s ulti-
mate aim was to reinforce the humanistic telos of the Convention and to 
broaden its semantic field in such a way as to maximize the protection 
offered. When the operation of Article 31(3)(c) is viewed from this per-
spective, the systemic integration effect is transformed into a simple 
collateral benefit. If, beyond integration (to the extent that integration is 
really achieved), the use of the systemic integration technique would not 
have advanced the objectives of the Convention as a human rights 
                                                                                                                      
 85. For an overview, see Mark E. Villiger, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in Interna-
tionale Gemeinschaft und Menschenrechte: Festschrift für Georg Ress 317, 319 
(2005).  
 86. It is interesting to note that, for Rudolf Bernhardt, the Golder judgment is a glob-
ally evolutive one. See Rudolf Bernhardt, Evolutive Treaty Interpretation, Especially of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 1999 German Y.B. Int’l L. 11, 17–18.  
 87. Golder, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17. 
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(“special”) treaty, this technique would have definitely been omitted. The 
aim and purpose of the ECHR are reinforced in the name of (and by way 
of) the international legal order and its principles; in practice, the sys-
temic integration objective operates as a supplement to the teleology of 
the Convention. 
Arguably, in the case of complementarity between the ECtHR and 
the relevant norms of international law, instead of proper and full inte-
gration—in the sense that the ILC, at least, perceives it—the primary 
reason why Article 31(3)(c) is establishing bridges between the Conven-
tion and international law is that the former benefits from the latter 
through absorption of normative elements which, although absent from 
its “imperfect” text, are both complementary and necessary for the effec-
tive promotion of its special scopes.88 That Article 31(c)(3) has a pseudo-
systemic integration effect does not come as a surprise; rather, it flows as 
the logical consequence of the fact that normative complementarity can 
hardly ever cause fragmentation. Accordingly, in the absence of any risk 
of fragmentation, it is impossible for the systemic integration technique 
to produce any genuine anti-fragmentation effect. Not only does its use 
then come free of cost for the Strasbourg Court, but it also offers a num-
ber of significant advantages: it generously provides the court with 
valuable normative “loans,” offers judges an opportunity to appear 
greatly respectful of general international law, and thereby increases the 
legitimacy of judgments which, like Golder, would otherwise be widely 
accused of activist tendencies.89  
                                                                                                                      
 88. The case law of the ECtHR also contains examples where extraneous norms, com-
plementary to the ECHR and introduced into the Court’s reasoning by way of systemic 
integration, did not result in a broadening of the pro homine effect of the Convention. In Saadi 
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13229/03, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17, 427 (2008), the applicant, an 
asylum seeker, alleged that his provisional detention while he awaited the local authorities’ 
decision on his refugee status application violated Article 5(1) of the Convention. The court 
noted that Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR provides an exception explicitly permitting states to 
detain aliens in an immigration context and held that the effect to be given to that exception 
should also cover asylum seekers—thus, as long as a state respects all other conditions ema-
nating from Article 5, asylum seekers may be legally detained until the state authorizes entry. 
In reaching that conclusion, the court considered instruments of international law (and soft 
law) that are complementary to Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR. Saadi, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 427, 
449. Evidently, the outcome of systemic integration in Saadi did not reinforce the human 
rights teleology of the Convention. It did, however, both complement and broaden the telos of 
the exception of Article 5(1)(f), the raison d’être of which is apparently to limit the effect of 
the general prohibition of the illegal deprivation of liberty. Hence, here again a pseudo-
systemic integration technique reinforced the text of the ECHR. The reason why it did not 
equally lead to a reinforcement of the humanistic object and purpose of the Convention is 
simply because the very object and purpose of the exception established by Article 5(1)(f) is to 
limit the effect of Article 5(1). 
 89. The Golder judgment was far from unanimous and was severely criticized as im-
posing new obligations on the parties. See, e.g., Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) 5, 24 (1975) (Verdross, J., separate opinion) (arguing that the Court’s dictum failed to 
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All the same, it would be a mistake to conclude from the Golder ex-
ample that the sole influence on the court was general international law. 
Even if the court does not rely explicitly on Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT 
in all cases, its practice shows that it tends to interpret the ECHR in light 
of the other sources of international law, including soft law90 and interna-
tional treaties (which, by definition, have only a relative effect and 
cannot be binding on the respondent state, unless the latter has duly 
signed and ratified them). Nevertheless, in all these instances, the effect 
of the “pseudo-systemic integration” technique is identical: Article 
31(3)(c) comes into play as an accessory of the object and purpose me-
thod of interpretation and, by expanding the semantic field of the 
Convention’s substantive provisions, and after successfully transplanting 
into it the complementary relevant norms of international law, it leads to 
the reinforcement of its human rights telos. 
To give just a few of many examples, in the Soering case91 the 
ECtHR twice took implicit advantage of the possibilities offered by Arti-
cle 31(3)(c) VCLT. First, it did so in order to decide whether the 
extradition of a person to a state where he risked the death penalty fell 
into the normative frame of Article 3 of the ECHR. It noted, inter alia, 
that the absolute prohibition of the conduct described by the Article was 
also “found in similar terms in other international instruments such as 
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
1969 American Convention on Human Rights and [was] generally rec-
ognized as an internationally accepted standard.”92 For the court, the fact 
that the right not to be extradited to a state where a person might be tor-
tured is explicitly protected by other specialized international 
instruments “did not mean that an essentially similar obligation [was] 
                                                                                                                      
respect the exigencies of another principle of law, namely of that of legal certainty); id. at 26–
31 (Zekia, J., separate opinion) (giving greater importance to the intention of the parties and to 
the grammatical analysis of Article 6); id. at 49–50 (Fitzmaurice, J., separate opinion) (“[T]he 
Statute of the Council of Europe . . . ; the principle of the rule of law; and the ‘general princi-
ples of law recognized by civilized nations’ mentioned in Article 38, paragraph I (c), of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice;—all these are factors external to Article 6.1 of the 
Human Rights Convention, and having little or no direct bearing on the precise point of inter-
pretation involved . . . . They might be useful as straws to clutch at, or as confirmatory of a 
view arrive at aliter—they are in no way determining in themselves, even taken cumula-
tively.”) (citation omitted). 
 90. Contra Mark E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties 433 (2009) (arguing that “the term ‘applicable’ [in Article 31(3)(c) of 
the VCLT] leaves no room for doubt: non-binding rules cannot be relied upon”). However, 
these non-binding rules may be taken into consideration if they reflect the emergence of a 
customary norm. For more details on the issue and examples of the various opinions that have 
been expressed within the scholarship, see infra notes 103, 105, 108–109. 
 91. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). 
 92. Id. at 34. 
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not already inherent in the general terms of Article 3.”93 Second, the 
court applied Article 31(3)(c) in relation to the question of whether the 
applicant’s age should be of any importance to the decision of the court. 
In so doing, the court gave an extensive list of international instruments 
prohibiting the death penalty for minors and concluded that, even though 
the ECHR did not contain such an explicit prohibition, “as a general 
principle the youth of the person concerned is a circumstance which is 
liable, with others, to put into question the compatibility with Article 3 
of measures connected with a death sentence.”94 
Likewise, in V. v. United Kingdom,95 the ECtHR implicitly applied 
Article 31(3)(c) twice within the same case. The second application did 
not introduce any particularly innovative elements: the aim was to facili-
tate the court’s reply to the claims of the applicant—a youth condemned 
by domestic courts for the perpetration of serious offenses—that deten-
tion sentence imposed on her/him in conformity with a system specific 
to the United Kingdom (detention during Her Majesty’s pleasure) 
breached Article 3 of the ECHR. The Strasbourg court interpreted the 
Convention in light of relevant international law treaties and, notably, 
soft law documents (mainly the U.N. General Assembly’s “Beijing 
Rules” concerning the “Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration 
of Juvenile Justice”)96 to conclude that the Convention does not prohibit 
states from subjecting a child convicted of a serious crime to an indeter-
minate sentence.97  
More interesting was the second application of Article 31(3)(c) by 
the court in V. v. United Kingdom. The question before the ECtHR was 
whether the fact that the criminal proceedings against the minor appli-
cant took place in public and that her/his name was published amounted 
to a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. Although the ECtHR silently 
applied the pseudo-systemic integration technique and, through it, re-
ferred to the very same external norms as in the previous example,98 this 
time it also did so from the perspective of evolution and inter-
temporality. The wording of the judgment placed explicit emphasis on 
the evolution that had taken place over the issue in question at the inter-
national level: the court highlighted the existence of “an international 
tendency in favour of the protection of the privacy of juvenile defen-
dants” and held that “the existence of such a trend is one factor to be 
                                                                                                                      
 93. Id. at 35. 
 94. Id. at 43, ¶ 108. 
 95. V. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24888/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
1999). 
 96. Id. at 143–83. 
97.   Id. at 183. 
 98. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30–31, ¶ 76 (1989). 
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taken into account.”99 Admittedly, one cannot give much weight to this 
unobtrusive reference by the court to the dynamism of the relevant hard 
and soft law norms. Omitting this reference would not have significantly 
changed its reasoning. Its importance is, rather, of symbolical value: it 
denotes that, exactly as the ILC suggests, the evolutive dimension is in-
herent to the systemic integration one—a position that, as will be 
demonstrated infra, this paper embraces, as long, of course, as the evolu-
tion stems from the international order and not the inner world of its 
special regimes. 
In its recent judgment in Demir v. Turkey, the court confirmed the in-
terrelation between systemic integration and evolutive interpretation.100 
Specifically, it explained that no matter whether a respondent state is 
formally bound by the relevant instruments of international law, “[i]t will 
be sufficient for the Court that [these relevant instruments of interna-
tional law] denote a continuous evolution in the norms and principles 
applied in international law.”101 Had the Grand Chamber of the court not 
chosen this case to provide a general roadmap for the use of Article 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT, the Demir judgment would have been just another 
on the list confirming the findings of the analysis done here; that is, the 
reason why the court referred to a number of complementary interna-
tional hard and soft international law instruments in Demir was—as in 
the other cases discussed in this Article—in order to better serve the ob-
ject and purpose of the Convention.  
After recalling its power to interpret the Convention in the light of 
international law,102 the Grand Chamber clarified that nothing prohibits it 
from also taking into account non-binding documents,103 or treaties that 
have not been ratified by the respondent state.104 “The Court observe[d] 
. . . that in searching for common ground among the norms of interna-
tional law it has never distinguished between sources of law according to 
whether or not they have been signed or ratified by the respondent 
State.”105 Although the impression initially given by the court was that it 
                                                                                                                      
 99. V. v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 176–77. 
 100. Demir v. Turkey, App. No. 34503/97, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1272 (2009). 
 101. Id. at 1297. 
 102. Id. at 1293. 
 103. Id. at 1294. Contra Orakhelashvili, supra note 34, at 366 (arguing that “Article 
31(3)(c) covers only established rules of international law, to the exclusion of principles of 
uncertain or doubtful legal status, so-called evolving legal standards, policy factors or more 
generally related notions”). 
 104. Demir, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1295. 
 105. Id. The more theoretical question raised here concerns whether all the parties to the 
treaty being interpreted need also be parties to the treaty relied upon for interpretation pur-
poses. The wording of Article 31(3)(c), which simply requires that the relevant rules of 
international law be “applicable in the relations between the parties,” is substantially vague 
and therefore not of any particular help. See Duncan French, Treaty Interpretation and the 
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felt free to rely upon any international treaty without regard to whether 
the treaty was binding on the parties, it later explained that it is allowed 
to do so only to the extent that the non-binding treaty reflects the parties’ 
“common values.”106 Hence, as long as the specialized international in-
struments reflect a dynamic “emerging consensus” at the international 
level, they may perfectly well constitute a relevant consideration for the 
court.107 Self-evidently, this is another name describing international cus-
tom in statu nascendi.108 Even if the customary rule is not yet 
crystallized, it at least reflects the “common intentions” of the signatory 
parties to the ECHR.109  
                                                                                                                      
Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules, 55 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 281, 307 (2006) (noting that 
“neither the provision itself nor its negotiating history provides a definitive answer to these 
questions of applicability”); see also Ulf Linderfalk, Who Are ‘The Parties’? Article 31, Para-
graph 3(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention and the ‘Principle of Systemic Integration’ 
Revisited, 55 Neth. Int’l L. Rev. 343 (2008) (defending the idea of the strictest possible 
interpretation and reading the term “parties” in Article 31(3)(c) as all parties to the interpreted 
treaty). But see id. at 345 n.8 (discussing scholars who disagree with such a narrow interpreta-
tion of Article 31(3)(c), including, among others, Petros Mavroidis, Joost Pauwelyn, Campbell 
McLachlan, and Duncan French). However, within the literature consensus exists that treaties 
such as the ECHR, which introduce obligations erga omnes partes, should be excluded from 
the broad interpretation of the term “parties” in Article 31(3)(c). As a general rule, the ILC 
suggests that “a better solution is to permit reference to another treaty provided that the par-
ties in dispute are also parties to that other treaty.” ILC, Final Report on Fragmentation of 
International Law, supra note 28, ¶ 472. Despite the evident risk of divergence in the interpre-
tation of a treaty that this choice entails, 
[such a] risk . . . would be mitigated by making the distinction between “reciprocal” 
or “synallagmatic” treaties (in which case mere “divergence” in interpretation cre-
ates no problem) and “integral” or “interdependent” treaties (or treaties concluded 
erga omnes partes) where the use of that other treaty in interpretation should not be 
allowed to threaten the coherence of the treaty to be interpreted. 
Id. 
 106. Demir v. Turkey, App. No. 34503/97, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1272, 1297 (2009). 
 107. See id. 
 108. Campbell McLachlan is rather critical of the idea that provisions of an international 
treaty to which not all the parties are bound should have acquired the status of international 
custom in order to be invoked. McLachlan, supra note 34, at 314. Inter alia, McLachlan ar-
gues that such an approach would preclude reference to treaties which, although widely 
accepted in the international community, are neither universally ratified nor accepted in all 
respects as stating customary law. Id. 
 109. The ILC seems to offer quite wide discretion to international judges. For treaty-
based rules to be introduced into judicial reasoning, it is enough that “[the rules] provide evi-
dence of the common understanding of the parties as to the object and purpose of the treaty 
under interpretation or as to the meaning of a particular term.” 2006 ILC Report, supra note 
49, ¶ 251(1)(21). Or, more precisely: 
[I]t might also be useful to take into account the extent to which that other treaty re-
lied upon can be said to have been “implicitly” accepted or at least tolerated by the 
other parties “in the sense that it can reasonably be considered to express the com-
mon intentions or understanding of all members as to the meaning of the . . . term 
concerned.” This approach has in fact been adopted in some of the decisions of the 
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For a traditional international lawyer, the court’s approach in the 
Demir case would have to be squarely rejected as it absolutely neglects 
states’ will and the doctrinal premises of the voluntarist theory. It is, 
however, more than obvious that the ECtHR has opted for a pro homine, 
objectivist reading of the Convention in fine. Nonetheless, no one can 
accuse the court of disingenuity. With its dictum,110 it openly admits that 
what this Article has defined as a pseudo-systemic integration should be 
placed under the broader umbrella of the object and purpose of the Con-
vention. Hence, “when [the ECtHR] considers the object and purpose of 
the Convention provisions, it also takes into account the international 
law background to the legal question before it.”111 Indeed, but for a “mi-
nor” detail, the Strasbourg Court is exceptionally frank. Yet, what it still 
does not avow is that the effective transmutation of Article 31(3)(c) into 
a complement to the teleological reading of the Convention depends 
upon one important precondition: the relevant norms of international law 
must be complementary to the Convention.  
ii. Opening the Convention to the Broader System in Order to 
Complement Its “Incomplete” Text: Non-Substantive Aspects  
Interestingly, ECtHR case law illustrates that this opening of the 
Convention to complementary elements of the broader international legal 
system is not limited to substantive law. While an activist court like the 
ECtHR may, in the name of the humanistic object and purpose of the 
Convention and by means of Article 31(3)(c), accommodate within its 
regime the substantive evolution taking place within the international 
                                                                                                                      
WTO Appellate Body. It gives effect to the sense in which certain multilateral treaty 
notions or concepts, though perhaps not found in treaties with identical member-
ship, are adopted nevertheless widely enough so as to give a good sense of a 
“common understanding” or a “state of the art” in a particular technical field with-
out necessarily reflecting formal customary law.  
ILC, Final Report on Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 28, ¶ 472. The ILC is 
referring explicitly to the work of Joost Pauwelyn, who was the first to note (in the context of 
WTO law) that 
the requirement is not that all the parties to the WTO agreement have, one after the 
other, formally and explicitly agreed with the non-WTO rule, nor even that this rule 
is otherwise legally binding on all WTO members. It could be submitted that the 
criterion is rather that the rule can be said to be at least implicitly accepted or toler-
ated by all WTO members, in the sense that the rule can reasonably be said to 
express the common intentions or understanding of all members as to what the par-
ticular WTO term means. 
Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law 
Relates to Other Rules of International Law 261 (2003). 
 110. The Article uses the term dictum in the sense of judicial dictum, that is, the product 
of a comprehensive discussion of legal issues. 
 111. Demir, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1295. 
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legal order, it may not be so welcoming to changes having an impact on 
the Convention’s systemic structures or the court’s institutional organiza-
tion and powers. 
In Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic v. Turkey,112 the court examined 
whether the interim measures prescribed under Rule 39 of its Rules of 
Court113 are obligatory upon states. Although its analysis focused on an 
evolutive interpretation of the Convention,114 which aimed at the effective 
protection of established rights,115 the ECtHR also examined the issue in 
the light of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, with reference to general prin-
ciples of international law and “in particular those concerning the 
binding force of interim measures indicated by other international 
courts.”116 Only after an impressively extensive reference to the relevant 
international practice and case law of other international fora117 did the 
court conclude that “in the light of the general principles of international 
law, the law of treaties and international case-law, the interpretation of 
the scope of interim measures cannot be dissociated from the proceed-
ings to which they relate or the decision on the merits they seek to 
protect.”118 Thus, interim measures should always be seen in the light and 
the context of the merits of a case. 
Nevertheless, despite recent trends at the international level over the 
question of the binding force of the interim measures, it is difficult to see 
how a “one size fits all” logic can prevail and equip each and every in-
ternational judicial forum with such a power in the absence of or even 
against state consent,119 while this consent provides the exclusive source 
                                                                                                                      
 112. Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46827/99 & 46951/99 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Feb. 6, 2003). The approach was also confirmed by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR. 
See Mamatkulov & Askarov v. Turkey, 2005–I Eur. Ct. H.R. 225, 330 (2005). 
 113. Rule 39(1) of the ECtHR’s Rules of Court provides that “[t]he Chamber or, where 
appropriate, its President may, at the request of a party or of any other person concerned, or of 
its own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which it considers should be 
adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings before it.” 
Eur. Ct. H.R. Rules of Court 39(1) (2009), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/ 
D1EB31A8-4194-436E-987E-65AC8864BE4F/0/RulesOfCourt.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 
2010). 
 114. See Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic, App. Nos. 46827/99 & 46951/99, at ¶ 94 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. Feb. 6, 2003). 
 115. See id. ¶ 105. 
 116. Id. ¶ 98. 
 117. Id. ¶¶ 39–54, 100–03. 
 118. Id. ¶ 105. 
 119. See Mamatkulov & Askarov v. Turkey, 2005–I Eur. Ct. H.R. 225, 356 (2005) 
(Caflisch, Turmen, & Kovler, J.J., joint partly dissenting) (suggesting that “the matter exam-
ined here is one of legislation rather than of judicial action” and that “[a]s neither the 
constitutive instrument of this Court nor general international law allows for holding that 
interim measures must be complied with by States, the Court cannot decide the contrary and, 
thereby, impose a new obligation on States Parties”); cf. Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Provisional 
Measures Indicated by International Courts: Emergence of a General Principle of Interna-
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of competence for every international judicial instance. Apparently, the 
systemic integration function of Article 31(3)(c) is actually compara-
tive120—by shedding light on the institutional evolution taking place 
within different regimes, it leads to a prima facie, groundless, and ultra 
vires institutional mimetism.121  
A more tempered approach takes into account that, in ECtHR prac-
tice, interim measures are a tool applied only exceptionally and in cases 
of urgency in order to prevent imminent or actual heinous human rights 
violations threatening the victim’s existence or physical integrity.122 For 
example, in Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic the applicants complained 
that their lives were at risk and they were in danger of being tortured 
after they were extradited to their home state in breach of the interim 
measures ordered by the court. That explained, it is easier to understand 
the court’s point when it linked interim measures to Article 34 of the 
Convention,123 under which states parties “under[took] not to hinder in 
any way the effective exercise of” the right to individual application. The 
scope of interim measures could not be dissociated from the proceedings 
to which they related and the merits they sought to safeguard, that is to 
say, the object and purpose of human rights. In short, here again, the 
pseudo-systemic integration function of Article 31(3)(c) appears to be 
inseparably (albeit indirectly) linked to the substantive telos of the 
ECHR. Accordingly, it can be safely concluded that the Mamatkulov & 
Abdurasulovic dictum is neither more nor less activist than that of all the 
other decisions in which Article 31(3)(c) has found an application for the 
reinforcement of the Convention’s substantive provisions. 
A second example confirms the argument that has been built so far, 
namely that the court may legitimately use Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT 
                                                                                                                      
tional Law, 57 Revue Hellénique de Droit International 53 (2004) (diagnosing, after 
proceeding with a thorough analysis of the judicial practice of a number of international fora, 
the crystallization of a general principle in international law over the binding effect of provi-
sional measures). 
 120. See Franz Matscher, Introduction: Les contraintes de l’interprétation juridiction-
nelle: Les méthodes d’interprétation de la Convention européenne, in L’interprétation de 
la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme 15, 30 (Frédéric Sudre ed., 1998). 
According to the author, in order for the ECtHR to find the ordinary meaning of a term it may, 
by means of comparison, refer to international instruments other than the ECHR. Evidently, 
this is another way of referring to systemic integration. See also De Schutter, supra note 54, at 
87–88 (arguing that the comparative analysis is indeed an expression of the evolutive method 
of interpretation.) Once again, the two methods—systemic integration and evolutive—
converge. 
 121. This term was introduced into the vocabulary of political science by Yves Mény, La 
greffe et le rejet: Les politiques du mimétisme institutionnel, in Les politiques du mimétisme 
institutionnel: La greffe et le rejet 7, 7 (Yves Mény ed., 1993). 
 122. Mamatkulov & Askarov, 2005–I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 328. 
 123. Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46827/99 & 46951/99, ¶ 107 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 6, 2003). 
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to strengthen the Convention’s human rights teleology only for sub-
stance-related issues. In its very first advisory opinion,124 the ECtHR was 
called to answer whether the Parliamentary Assembly (P.A.) of the 
Council of Europe could legally refuse to accept a list of candidates for 
judge at the ECtHR submitted by a member state solely on the basis of 
gender-related issues, even when the list formally satisfied all conditions 
imposed by the ECHR. An alternative way of formulating this question 
would be to ask whether the practice of the P.A., which required states to 
include at least one candidate belonging to the under-represented sex in 
their list of three candidates (a positive measure against the under-
representation of female judges at the ECtHR), constituted an institu-
tional custom having a normative effect complementary to the text of the 
Convention. 
The court’s point of departure was the text of the Convention and, 
more specifically, its provisions concerning the criteria and the proce-
dure for the election of judges.125 These were read as imposing a non-
exhaustive number of conditions, with no explicit limits on the criteria 
that could be employed by the P.A.126 On this view, the P.A. enjoyed wide 
discretion in developing practices that would guarantee that the criteria 
implicit to the Convention’s incomplete text would be satisfied.127 How-
ever, the court concluded that the criterion relating to the candidates’ 
gender lacked links to the Convention’s text128 and therefore could not 
fall within the P.A.’s implied powers. Nevertheless, the court sought al-
ternate grounds on which to justify the gender criterion. After stressing 
the legitimacy of the P.A.’s gender-equality policy, the court silently ap-
plied Article 31(3)(c)—this time under a so-called “comparative 
analysis”129—and tried to demonstrate the existence of a “far-reaching 
consensus as to the need to promote gender balance within the State and 
in the national and international public service, including the judici-
ary.”130 Once again, the examples given by the court stem from both 
relevant instruments of international law and the practice of other inter-
                                                                                                                      
 124. Advisory Opinion on Certain Legal Questions Concerning the Lists of Candidates 
Submitted with a View to the Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 2008), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
 125. Id. ¶ 45; see also ECHR, supra note 3, arts. 21–22. 
 126. Advisory Opinion on Certain Legal Questions Concerning the Lists of Candidates 
Submitted with a View to the Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights, ¶ 45 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008). 
 127. See id. ¶¶ 45–47. 
 128. Id. ¶ 48. 
 129. Advisory Opinion on Certain Legal Questions Concerning the Lists of Candidates 
Submitted with a View to the Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights, at   
¶ 34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (last visited Mar. 27, 
2010). 
 130. Id. ¶ 49. 
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national institutions, especially systems of the other judicial fora.131 The 
results of this comparative approach, although not entirely satisfactory,132 
convinced the court of the existence at the international level of an (evo-
lutive) trend towards the promotion of gender balance.133  
This use of the comparative/evolutive method in its reasoning would 
likely create in connoisseurs of ECtHR case law an expectation that the 
court would conclude with an affirmation of a consensus-stemming trend 
in international law in favor of gender balance, and that it would evoke 
from this a complementary effect on the text of the Convention. How-
ever, to the disappointment of the adherents of international legal 
objectivism, the court looked to the volonté of the member states, as re-
flected in the practice of another organ of the Council of Europe, namely 
the Committee of Ministers. The court concluded that by deliberately 
choosing to “not to act upon the Assembly’s proposals to amend Article 
22 of the Convention,”134 the Committee proved that “the Contracting 
Parties, which alone have the power to amend the Convention, ha[d] thus 
set the boundaries which the Assembly may not overstep.”135 Therefore, 
the court had to refrain from basing its decision on the relevant practice 
of the other international institutions. This was the only way for it to re-
strain its propensity for activism. Evidently, one of the most important 
factors explaining this decision was the explicit refusal by states to en-
dorse the P.A.’s institutional practice. Given the particular circumstances 
of the case, the court had no other choice than to give priority to the will 
of the contracting parties. While its argument was absolutely valid, it is 
also important to highlight, however, the fact that the court left aside the 
object and purpose reading of the Convention. An institutional question 
that, despite its indisputable legitimacy, has only limited (if any) links to 
the Convention’s substantive provisions leaves no space for a teleologi-
cal interpretation.  
b. Emphasizing Evolution 
In addition to assessing the function of systemic integration with re-
gard to complementary norms, the examples presented so far have 
sought to demonstrate that the above-mentioned technique is efficient 
enough to open the Convention’s box to the broader international legal 
system, fulfilling a special aim of capturing the evolution and socio-
normative tendencies within this broader system. In a nutshell, the find-
ings of the analysis indicate that the systemic integration technique can 
                                                                                                                      
 131. Id. ¶¶ 30–35, 49. 
 132. See id. ¶ 34. 
 133. Id. ¶ 49. 
 134. Id. ¶ 50. 
 135. Id. ¶ 51. 
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very well accommodate the evolutive one. As far as the opposite is con-
cerned, by definition, the evolutive method of interpretation always 
seeks to incorporate the evolution constantly taking place in the broader 
socio-normative environment within which a given norm is created or 
situated and into which it is integrated. Thus, the two techniques not on-
ly converge and complement each other but also share their legal basis in 
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.  
However, this can only be true if the dynamic reading of the Conven-
tion is made with reference to the international legal system. The first 
part of the analysis that follows will focus on cases of convergence be-
tween the systemic integration and evolutive methods through a dynamic 
reading of the ECHR that references international law. In contrast, the 
second part will attempt to show that when courts applying the evolutive 
technique look to normative sources from outside the international order, 
not only is it impossible for this technique to converge with the systemic 
integration method, but it may even ultimately introduce within interna-
tional law changes that are (sometimes) difficult to digest, and that as a 
result the evolutive technique can sabotage the anti-fragmentation objec-
tive of Article 31(3)(c).  
i. ECHR Evolution Following the Tempo 
of the International Legal Order  
Outside the V. v. United Kingdom case discussed supra, another in-
teresting example of convergence between the systemic and the dynamic 
techniques is the Sigurjónnson case,136 which involved the right of asso-
ciation. The court, after referring to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights and 
the practice of the International Labour Office, concluded that “a grow-
ing measure of common ground has emerged . . . at the international 
level,”137 guaranteeing the so-called negative aspect of the freedom of 
association, that is, the freedom to not join or to withdraw from an asso-
ciation. It concluded that the effect given to the Convention had to be 
adapted to encompass the growing measure. Although the court did not 
focus on the object and purpose method of interpretation, it explicitly 
rejected the possibility of giving priority to states’ will as reflected in the 
travaux of the Convention.138 
The second example of convergence between the systemic and the 
dynamic techniques is equally clear and significant. This significance 
stems from the fact that the reason why the court investigated the ongo-
                                                                                                                      
 136. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993). 
 137. Id. at 15. 
 138. Id. 
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ing evolution in the international system did not have to do with the de-
limitation of the semantic field of a Convention provision; rather, the 
court used Article 31(3)(c) to attribute a special normative quality to Ar-
ticle 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits torture. In order to conclude in the 
Al-Adsani case139 that the obligations of Article 3 are of a jus cogens na-
ture, the court proceeded by giving an extensive list of relevant 
international instruments and case law that confirm this approach.140 Ac-
cordingly, in the court’s words: 
Other areas of public international law bear witness to a growing 
recognition of the overriding importance of the prohibition of 
torture. . . . In addition, there have been a number of judicial 
statements to the effect that the prohibition of torture has at-
tained the status of a peremptory norm or jus cogens. 141 
Hence, the relevant inputs from international law demonstrated that the 
prohibition of torture has evolved and that it had “achieved”142 the status 
of jus cogens. 
In all the instances that have been presented so far, Article 31(3)(c) 
facilitates both dynamism in interpretation and pseudo-integration. 
Without regard to whether the court highlights integration or evolution, 
the function of Article 31(3)(c) is in substance identical. It acts as a sup-
plement to the teleological method of interpretation and facilitates the 
effective widening of the scope and effect of the ECHR’s substantive 
provisions.  
ii. Beyond Article 31(3)(c) VCLT: The ECHR at 
the Forefront of International Evolution 
As argued in extenso supra, the ECHR is a special international law 
treaty in the sense that, inter alia, it is indissolubly attached to the idea 
of a regional quasi-constitution destined to promote Europe’s public or-
der effectively. Consequently, the Convention’s dualistic nature allows 
ECtHR judges to feel equally competent to investigate socio-normative 
evolution both in the international legal order and in what (in Union law 
terms) is usually called the common constitutional traditions of the con-
tracting parties. Hence, the systemic integration-oriented, dynamic 
interpretation of the ECHR constitutes only one of the two faces of the 
evolutive method. Dynamism in the reading of the ECHR is not limited 
to the impact of the international legal order. Quite the contrary, it 
                                                                                                                      
 139. See Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001–XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79. 
 140. Id. at 92–93. 
 141. Id. at 101. 
 142. Id. 
TZEVELEKOS FTP  4M.DOC 4/14/2010  11:50 AM 
662 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 31:621 
 
extends well beyond the confines of that order and Article 31(3)(c) of the 
VCLT.  
That neither the ECHR regime nor the international legal order con-
tains an equivalent to Article 31(3)(c) that explicitly enables the ECtHR 
to proceed with an “endoscopic” evolutive interpretation may easily be 
remedied either by analogy of law or, more simply, by resorting to the 
well-established practice of the court.  
The functions of the evolutive/dynamic method can be thought of as 
a sui generis periscope, which offers both an endoscopic and a telescopic 
field of vision through exposure to both municipal (endoscopic) and in-
ternational (telescopic) law. Although only the latter is linked directly to 
Article 31(3)(c), the systemic integration technique and the objective of 
maintaining the unity of international law, the interrelation of the dy-
namic technique’s two dimensions is circular. What the court does in 
substance when—as the next few examples will show—it considers evo-
lution occurring in the national legal sphere, is investigate state practice 
and the respective opinio juris. In other words, the court inquires into the 
emergence of international normative trends, if not of established cus-
tomary rules. In this sense, the endoscopic version of the dynamic 
technique reflects evolution occurring within the broader international 
legal system. If this is true, then the way lies open for the court to take 
into account the socio-normative progress that arises within the munici-
pal orders of both its contracting parties and third states. The only 
conditions for doing so are that the evolution in question present the qua-
litative and quantitative characteristics that amount to the emergence of a 
well-established normative trend and that they do not result in a simple, 
vague, and infertile comparison, since doing so would unavoidably lead 
to unjustified judicial activism.  
The first example concerns one of the most famous judgments of the 
court. In the Marckx case,143 the court assessed problems of equality be-
tween children born in and out of wedlock using an evolutive 
interpretation based on both national and international law. Hence, “the 
Court [could not] but be struck by the fact that the domestic law of the 
great majority of the member States of the Council of Europe ha[d] 
evolved and [were] continuing to evolve, in company with the relevant 
international instruments, towards full juridical recognition of the maxim 
‘mater semper certa est.’ ”144 Although the evolution of the issue was, at 
that time, far from well-established at the international level and only a 
very small number of states had ratified the relevant international in-
struments, “this state of affairs [could not] be relied on in opposition to 
                                                                                                                      
 143. See Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979). 
 144. Id. at 19–20. 
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the evolution noted above.”145 By validating this dynamic state practice, 
the court—as usual—expanded the semantic field of its Convention’s 
provisions and thereby reinforced its telos. Beyond this, the ECtHR vali-
dated a dynamic opinio juris that was by that time emerging at the 
regional level and, at the same time, it internationalized the respective 
practice. As a result, the court brought the ECHR to the forefront of in-
ternational evolution, and the broader international system added one 
more special instrument evolving towards the direction suggested by the 
ECtHR. 
In a second example, the court notably chose to base its dictum on 
the domestic practice of a handful of non-contracting parties. In its 
judgment in the Christine Goodwin case,146 the ECtHR extended legal 
status to post-operative transsexuals, clearly departing from previous 
case law147 that had granted state authorities a margin of appreciation in 
determining this status. Despite a lack of social consensus at the Euro-
pean level,148 the court opted for a dynamic interpretation based on “the 
clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in fa-
vour . . . of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative 
transsexuals.”149 As proof of this trend, the court gave the examples of 
domestic practice in “Singapore, . . . Canada, South Africa, Israel, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand and all except two of the States of the United States 
of America.”150 Although one may agree with the court’s decision to im-
pose common standards, one should nevertheless take note that the use 
of the evolutive method of interpretation in Goodwin resembles a fairly 
maladroit correction of its previous case law rather than an adaptation to 
a genuine dynamic social change. Consequently, the Court’s dictum 
seems to be deprived of any profound socio-normative foundations and, 
therefore, instead of following an international tempo, seems instead to 
aspire to introduce a change in tempo. 
That said, the more useful theoretical question is whether such a 
pushy interpretation of the Convention may contribute to normative 
fragmentation. In order to answer this question, one should not overlook 
the particularity of the subject matter of human rights and the fact that 
this specific discipline of law reflects certain values that are possibly 
universally accepted at a macro level. When the question comes, how-
ever, to the ad hoc standards of protection or to the priority that should 
be given to certain values over others, such consensus—at least at the 
                                                                                                                      
 145. Id. at 19. 
 146. See Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002–VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. 
 147. See sources cited supra note 58. 
 148. Goodwin, 2002–VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 21, 29–30. 
 149. Id. at 30. 
 150. Id. at 21. 
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global level—does not exist. The international legal order is, neverthe-
less, able to accommodate multiple standards of human rights protection. 
Normative fragmentation will only occur if the standards of protection 
applied at the regional level become thinner than those prevailing at the 
universal level. In other words, there is plenty of room for flexibility.  
Yet, if one leaves aside the axiological (and therefore by definition 
greatly subjective) field of human rights, the answer at a more general 
level to the question of whether an “endoscopic” (that is, divergent from 
systemic integration and not supported by Article 31(3)(c)) application 
of the evolutive method of interpretation may contribute to the fragmen-
tation of international law depends upon two main factors. First, it 
depends on the socio-normative state of affairs of a given subject matter 
within the international legal order. Second, it depends on whether and to 
what extent an order such as the international legal one is likely to 
evolve in the direction towards which the dictum of an international 
court points. Hence, even if particular case law is seen to contribute to 
prima facie fragmentation of international law—and therefore, to im-
pede Article 31(3)(c)’s systemic integration objective—there is nothing 
to suggest that this characteristic will not be temporary. International 
society is far from static: by nature, its legal order undergoes constant 
evolution and what might today appear as an activist and illegitimate 
judicial interpretation may tomorrow turn into a pioneering exposition 
which, instead of challenging the uniformity of international law, will 
occupy a central and legitimate place within it.  
The general conclusion to be reached from the analysis of this first 
category of case law (discussing the use of Article 31(3)(c) by the 
ECtHR in the case of complementarity between the ECHR and interna-
tional law) is twofold. First, the systemic integration method functions in 
reality as a complement to the teleological interpretation and, rather than 
producing effective anti-fragmentation results, in reality it “uses” inter-
national law in order to reinforce the object and purpose of the 
Convention. Yet this applies only with regard to the substantive norms of 
the Convention. Second, although the systemic integration method and 
the evolutive technique do converge under Article 31(3)(c), the (endo-
scopic version of the) evolutive method of interpretation extends well 
beyond the scope of systemic integration, makes reference to sources of 
evolution different than international law, and produces results that, un-
der certain conditions, may even challenge the normative consistency of 
the international legal order. That being sustained, the Article now moves 
in discussing the second scenario of normative systemic integration, that 
is, the case of conflicts between the norms of the ECHR and interna-
tional law.    
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2. Conflict Between Norms of International Law and the ECHR 
If there is one area in which it is important for systemic integration 
technique to produce effective anti-fragmentation results, it is in cases in 
which norms conflict. Even when a particular judgment remains silent as 
to the applicability of Article 31(3)(c), the latter comes into action ipso 
facto. Even so, what is significant is that relevant norms of international 
law introduced into judicial reasoning are not those that the court con-
siders relevant, but rather those that are introduced de facto by the 
circumstances of a case and are in conflict with the Convention. The ex-
amples that follow concern three types of conflicts respectively: (1) 
conflicts between the ECHR and general international law; (2) conflicts 
between the ECHR and other treaties of international law which produce 
a relative normative effect for its parties; and (3) conflicts between hu-
man rights treaties. 
The best example of a conflict between the ECHR and general inter-
national law is the Al-Adsani judgment,151 discussed supra as an example 
of convergence between systemic integration and evolutive methods of 
interpretation. In a second application of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, 
the ECtHR in Al-Adsani addressed whether the application of the inter-
national law rule of state immunity legitimately restricted the applicant’s 
right of access to justice, that is, a right, according to the Court’s case 
law, which is inherent to Article 6 of the ECHR. By resorting to Article 
31(3)(c), the court recalled that “[t]he Convention, including Article 6, 
[could not] be interpreted in a vacuum. . . . [It] should so far as possible 
be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which 
it forms part, including those relating to the grant of State immunity.” 152 
This is the reason why, according to the Court 
measures taken . . . which reflect generally recognised rules of 
public international law on State immunity cannot in principle 
be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on the 
right of access to a court . . . . [S]ome restrictions on access must 
likewise be regarded as inherent, an example being those limita-
tions generally accepted by the community of nations as part of 
the doctrine of State immunity. 153  
Based on this Al-Adsani dictum, one could easily reach—
incorrectly—the conclusion that a right guaranteed by the ECHR can 
                                                                                                                      
 151. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001–XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79. For similar cases on this 
point, see also Fogarty v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 157; McElhinney v. Ireland, 
2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 37; Kalogeropoulou v. Greece, App. no. 59021/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2002) 
(decision as to the admissibility). 
 152. Id. at 100.  
 153. Id. 
TZEVELEKOS FTP  4M.DOC 4/14/2010  11:50 AM 
666 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 31:621 
 
lawfully be restricted by a conflicting norm of general international law, 
which, ratione materiae, constitutes lex specialis. However, a precondi-
tion for lex specialis to supersede in a conflict of norms is that the norms 
are of the same nature (that is, of the same hierarchical rank). If this had 
been the case in Al-Adsani, then the lex specialis norm, which covers 
immunities, would naturally have excluded the application of the con-
flicting lex generalis, that is, Article 6 of the ECHR, and the debate over 
the court’s choice would have been simple.154  
However, as explained earlier, the Convention’s substantive provi-
sions introduce obligations erga omnes partes. The consequences of this 
normative quality for Al-Adsani are twofold. First, the logic of lex spe-
cialis does not apply to norms not of equivalent standing. Second, given 
that the right to access to justice is a typical erga omnes partes obliga-
tion, it is—like all non-jus cogens norms—susceptible to legitimate 
limitations: the legality and the extent of these limitations are measured 
through the well-known proportionality test—a technique used to set 
priorities after balancing the material significance of the conflicting 
norms in light of circumstances particular to a given case. Yet in the Al-
Adsani case the court seemed to limit its proportionality test through an 
obscure reference to the raison d’être of the state immunity rule and its 
importance for the international community in general. According to the 
Court, the doctrine of state immunity pursues “the legitimate aim of 
complying with international law to promote comity and good relations 
between States through the respect of another State’s sovereignty.”155 As 
a result, instead of proceeding with a proper, in-depth test of proportion-
ality, focusing on circumstances specific to the case, the ECtHR 
cursorily based its dictum on an implicit presumption that the general 
international law norm in question satisfied in abstracto the require-
ments of proportionality.156 Thus, despite its explicit references to the 
Convention’s special nature,157 in reality, the court deliberately chose to 
uncritically subsume its own regime to general international law. More-
over, by accepting that the custom over state immunity did not “in 
principle . . . impos[e] a disproportionate restriction” on the conflicting 
right of the Convention and without proceeding any further with its usual 
                                                                                                                      
 154. The judgment was far from unanimous. Hierarchy of norms was precisely one of 
the points that gave rise to the most severe criticisms. See id. at 111–12 (Rozakis, J. & 
Caflisch, J., dissenting). But see Gardiner, supra note 38, at 288 (arguing that the conflicting 
norms in Al-Adsani are parallel, that is to say, of equal normative weight). 
 155. Al-Adsani, 2001–XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 99. 
 156. Id. at 115 (Loucaides, J., dissenting) (arguing that any form of immunity which is 
applied without balancing the competing interests amounts to a disproportionate limitation of 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR). 
 157. Id. at 100. 
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proportionality test,158 the court appears to have misused Article 31(3)(c), 
the application of which is meant to be limited simply to introducing 
relevant norms of international law, without either introducing presump-
tions concerning their value, nature, or effect, or authorizing the court to 
diverge from the judicial steps required by both its well-established prac-
tice and law.  
Accordingly, even if one were to agree with the conclusions reached 
by the Al-Adsani judgment and its prioritization of state immunity over 
Article 6 of the ECHR, it is difficult to overlook its obvious defect in 
reasoning, which not only leads to an unjustified restriction in the sphere 
of application of Article 6 of the ECHR, but also reveals a clear tendency 
to use Article 31(3)(c) abusively as an ersatz substitute for the propor-
tionality test. Significantly, the Al-Adsani judgment should not be seen 
as a model for the use of Article 31(3)(c) in conflicts of norms. Rather, 
the Article’s intended function is limited to simply introducing the con-
flicting norms into judicial reasoning so that a judge may assess their 
effect.  
It should come as no surprise then that the Court, which instrumen-
tally or not failed to apply the proportionality test in the Al-Adsani 
judgment, later put this test fully into action in a case which concerned a 
conflict between the Convention’s substantive norms and the provisions 
of a bilateral treaty negotiated between two states parties to the ECHR. 
To move, then, to the second scenario in which Article 31(3)(c) is used 
to address normative conflict, it is helpful to look at the Slivenko case.159 
In that case, the applicant was deported from Latvia under the terms of a 
bilateral treaty between Latvia and the Russian Federation providing for 
the withdrawal of the Russian army from Latvian territory. Under the 
terms of the treaty, Russian military personnel and all members of their 
families were subject to removal from Latvia. The court found that the 
consequent interference with the applicant’s right to privacy of family 
life, protected under Article 8 of the ECHR, was in accordance with the 
law (the bilateral international treaty) and pursued a legitimate aim (pro-
tection of national security).160 But this time the court proceeded with an 
in-depth test of proportionality161 and concluded that the Latvian authori-
ties, by perceiving the public interest in abstract terms and by not 
examining on a case-by-case basis “whether each person concerned pre-
sented a specific danger to national security or public order,”162 “failed to 
strike a fair balance between the legitimate aim of the protection of 
                                                                                                                      
 158. Id. 
 159. Slivenko v. Latvia, 2003–X Eur. Ct. H.R. 229. 
 160. Id. at 263. 
 161. Id. at 263–67. 
 162. Id. at 266. 
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national security and the interest of the protection of the applicants’ 
rights under Article 8.”163 Consequently, the respondent state was found 
to be in breach of its obligations under the Convention.164 
On first impression, it seems that the ECtHR in its Slivenko judg-
ment favored its own Convention. However, this is only partially true. 
The main aim of the ECtHR was to investigate the extent to which the 
two conflicting international treaties—the ECHR and the bilateral 
agreement between Latvia and Russia—could harmonically produce 
their respective, desired effects.165 Given the obvious normative conflict 
between them, the court proceeded by examining whether the ECHR 
and, more specifically, Article 8, was susceptible to limitation so that 
necessary space could be created for the conflicting bilateral treaty to 
achieve its intended ends. Since Article 8 of the ECHR does not intro-
duce any obligations of a jus cogens nature, it appears that it can be 
elastically limited in “accordance with law,” that is to say (in the present 
case) in accordance with the will of two member states that had bilater-
ally contracted to derogate from the Convention to allow withdrawal of 
the military personnel from one state to another. However, the erga om-
nes partes nature of Article 8 of the ECHR should be perceived not only 
as allowing derogations; it should also be perceived as giving priority to 
the effect of a norm that aims to collectively promote a value common 
within European public order. Hence, although at the macro level the 
right to family life may suffer limitations in order to promote a legiti-
mate aim of public interest—in this particular case the protection of 
national security—at the micro level, limitations can only be accepted if 
and to the extent that they comply with the exigencies of proportionality 
which, in light of the particular circumstances of each individual case, 
balances the general interest with the private interest (rights) of human 
beings. 
Therefore, a more direct, although provocative, way to describe the 
logic of the court in the Slivenko judgment would be to admit that it con-
trols, by way of a proportionality assessment, the compatibility of 
conflicting international norms with the substantive provisions of its 
Convention, a regional quasi-constitution. Due to the latter’s erga omnes 
partes quality, derogations are indeed allowed, but only to the extent le-
gitimately justified by the facts of each particular case. As a 
consequence, the individual law-making volonté of states, as reflected by 
                                                                                                                      
 163. Id. at 267. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See Ineta Ziemele, Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights and Integrity 
of International Law, in L’influence des Sources, supra note 13, at 205. However, Ziemele 
remains rather critical of the idea of directly recognizing the normative primacy of the 
ECHR’s substantive provisions. Id. at 203.  
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bilateral or bilateralizable agreements introducing norms of jus dispositi-
vum, can be valid only as long as this volonté does not introduce 
obligations that come into disproportionate conflict with the Convention, 
the provisions of which apparently enjoy a certain type of normative 
primacy, in the sense of elastic priority in their fulfillment. 
The third and last hypothesis of conflict of norms to be discussed 
here is that of a conflict between the Convention and another interna-
tional treaty which also introduces obligations of an erga omnes partes 
nature. In the Jersild case,166 the applicant, a journalist, had been con-
victed by domestic courts for having conducted and broadcasted an 
interview with members of a racist group, as part of a documentary on 
the phenomenon of racism. The national authorities, seeking to comply 
with the 1965 U.N. International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, which requires states to fight racism 
through affirmative action, sentenced the applicant for having aided and 
abetted the dissemination of racist remarks. The court first underlined 
that a respondent state’s obligations under the Convention “must be in-
terpreted, to the extent possible, so as to be reconcilable with its 
obligations under the U.N. Convention.”167 However, in applying the pro-
portionality test, the court paid particular attention to the fact that the 
applicant had neither made the objectionable statements himself nor in-
tended to spread racist ideas; on the contrary, his objective was to raise 
public awareness over a sensitive issue of great public concern.168 It con-
cluded that by disproportionately interfering with the freedom of 
expression of the applicant, the domestic courts had breached their obli-
gations under Article 10 of the ECHR.169  
The first comment to make on the dictum of the court in the Jersild 
case is that the observations made previously regarding the Slivenko 
judgment remain relevant—the outcome suggests prima facie that the 
ECtHR favored its own regime. However, by investigating the legitimate 
limitations that the ECHR may (always in the light of the context of the 
case) accommodate, the court sought to reconcile the two regimes: it 
only concluded that Article 10 of the ECHR had been violated after hav-
ing applied the proportionality test. Finally, although the normative force 
of both the external norms and the provisions of the Convention in ab-
stracto remained intact, the facts of the case required that priority be 
given to only one of the two regimes. The fact that, in the end, the pro-
portionality test favored the ECHR is exclusively the result of the 
                                                                                                                      
 166. See Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995). 
 167. Id. at 22–23. 
 168. Id. at 23–25. 
 169. Id. at 26. 
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particular circumstances of the case; should these have been different, so 
would the result have been. 
What makes the Jersild case particularly notable is the court’s appli-
cation of the proportionality test in light of the fact that the two 
conflicting norms had the same normative nature or formal value (erga 
omnes partes). Exactly as in all other cases, the court balanced the con-
flicting material sources and set priorities in light of the circumstances 
particular to the case. Additionally, the circumstances of the Jersild case 
reveal that the substantive conflict did not arise between the ECHR and 
ICERD directly, but rather between the ECHR and the respondent state’s 
practice developed to comply with the exigencies of the U.N. Conven-
tion. This explains why the lex specialis maxim is inappropriate: even 
where there appears prima facie to be a conflict between human rights 
norms, true normative conflicts in abstracto—that is, conflicts per se—
between fundamental human rights are highly unlikely.170 
3. Resort to (General) International Law for Questions Outside 
the ECHR’s Subject Matter  
The third scenario to be discussed in assessing the effectiveness of 
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT against normative fragmentation corre-
sponds to cases in which the ECtHR must resort to general international 
law to address preliminary issues that fall outside the Convention’s sub-
ject matter and do not find an answer within its “lacunary” text. That a 
special international regime must appeal to the broader international le-
gal system to obtain answers to legal questions that are, in light of the 
circumstances of the case before it, a conditio sine qua non for it to op-
erate, is proof that special regimes neither are self-contained nor can 
subsist effectively if entirely disconnected from their natural environ-
ment—that is, the international legal order.171 Nevertheless, several of the 
examples below seek to prove that the ECtHR is far from disoriented by 
the false allures of self-contained regimes. On the contrary, its more re-
cent case law contains several sound examples in which the court 
willingly aligned its dicta with prevailing trends within the international 
order (and especially with those emanating from the U.N. system), de-
                                                                                                                      
 170. Concerning the typology of normative conflicts, see Pauwelyn, supra note 109, at 
164–66, 175–78. According to the classification proposed by Pauwelyn, the conflict in Jersild 
should be defined as a “potential conflict in the applicable law.” Id. at 176. 
 171. See Koskenniemi, supra note 11, at 17 (“Many of the new treaty-regimes in the 
fields of trade, environmental protection or human rights did have special rules for rule-
creation, rule-application and change. This is what made them special after all. But when the 
rules run out, or regimes fail, then the institutions always refer back to the general law that 
appears to constitute the frame within which they exist.”).  
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spite the fact that such a choice was not always free of cost for the Con-
vention’s effet utile. 
The most interesting example with which to start is the Loizidou 
case, discussed in the introduction of this Article.172 Although the court’s 
decisions and judgments in Loizidou suggest that the anti-fragmentation 
function of systemic integration might be costless for the human rights 
teleology of the Convention, what is striking in Loizidou is that unity and 
fragmentation of international law are shown to co-exist. Thus, if the 
court’s ultimate aim in silently diverging from ICJ precedent on reserva-
tions to international treaties173 was to favor the ECHR’s special object 
and purpose, this object and purpose was decidedly not an issue in a 
number of other instances in which avoidance of normative fragmenta-
tion over preliminary questions of international law either had no 
significant impact on the human rights effect of the Convention or was 
even a prerequisite for the court in order to exercise its jurisdiction.  
Starting then from the first hypothesis, the ECtHR resorted in Loizi-
dou to the broader international system for reasons relatively unrelated 
to the object and purpose of the Convention when deciding on the valid-
ity of the acts of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC). In 
this case, the applicant complained that Turkey had prevented her from 
peacefully enjoying her property in northern Cyprus, an area over which 
the government of Cyprus has exercised no effective control since a mili-
tary intervention by Turkey in 1974 and the subsequent establishment of 
the TRNC.174 In concluding that the TRNC was not regarded by the in-
ternational community as a state under international law and, 
consequently, that its acts lacked validity, the court expressly applied 
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and referred to relevant U.N. Security 
Council Resolutions.175 By the same token, the court explicitly resorted 
to ICJ case law and, inspired by it, concluded that “international law 
recognises the legitimacy of certain legal arrangements and transactions 
. . . for instance as regards the registration of births, deaths and mar-
riages, ‘the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the 
inhabitants of the [t]erritory.’ ”176 Interestingly, the ECtHR achieved unity 
of international law thanks to its voluntary (and costless) openness to the 
interpretative authority of the ICJ case law. 
                                                                                                                      
 172. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 173. For a collection of essays on the issue of reservations to human rights treaties, see 
Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Vienna Convention Regime: Con-
flict, Harmony and Reconciliation (Ineta Ziemele ed., 2004). 
 174. Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996–VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216, 2221–22. 
 175. Id. at 2230–31. 
 176. Id. at 2231. 
TZEVELEKOS FTP  4M.DOC 4/14/2010  11:50 AM 
672 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 31:621 
 
The Loizidou saga presents an extremely interesting example also 
with regard to the second scenario presented supra, namely when avoid-
ing normative fragmentation over preliminary questions of international 
law is a prerequisite for the court to exercise its jurisdiction. Whether the 
court would exercise jurisdiction depended on how it answered another 
question of general international law, namely to whom the illicit conduct 
of the TRNC authorities should be attributed. Although its reasoning 
lacked the clarity one would expect from a judicial forum of its stand-
ing,177 the court merged and answered in the affirmative both the 
questions of the attribution of the conduct of the TRNC to the respon-
dent state and the extraterritorial jurisdiction of that state (and thereby 
the ECtHR itself).178 Interestingly, rather than referring to relevant nor-
mative tendencies at the international level, the ECtHR chose to ground 
its reasoning on the teleology of the Convention. Hence, “[b]earing in 
mind the object and purpose of the Convention,” it concluded that “the 
responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a conse-
quence of military action—whether lawful or unlawful—it exercises 
effective control of an area outside its national territory.”179 Nevertheless, 
although the court seemed to neglect the systemic integration method of 
interpretation, in substance its reasoning did nothing more than contrib-
ute to the crystallization of the so-called doctrine of the de facto organ, 
as this was codified a few years later by ILC in Article 8 of its Norms on 
State Responsibility.180 
Equally significant is the collateral effect generated by the systemic 
integration technique in the frame of another case, Banković,181 which, 
despite its factual differences with the Loizidou case, similarly raised the 
question of the extraterritorial effect of the Convention. Although the 
                                                                                                                      
 177. See, e.g., Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (1995) (decision on 
the preliminary objections). 
 178. Id. at 23–24. 
 179. Id. at 24. 
 180. ILC Norms on State Responsibility, supra note 74, art. 8 (“The conduct of a person 
or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person 
or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, 
that State in carrying out the conduct.”). Interestingly, the interpretation of Article 8 of the ILC 
Norms on State Responsibility has opened a Pandora’s box of normative fragmentation in the 
international case law. In 1999, just a few years after the ECtHR Loizidou decision, the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) departed from the ICJ’s 
Nicaragua “effective control” test. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
1986 I.C.J. 14, 64. The Tribunal introduced a less strict level of control in its Tadić judgment, 
described as “overall control.” Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 120 (July 
15, 1999). The ICJ then answered with its recent Genocide case law, which criticized the 
ICTY’s test and insisted on its own Nicaragua dictum. Application of Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) 2007 
I.C.J. 1, 144–45 (Feb. 26). 
 181. Banković v. Belgium, 2001–XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 331. 
TZEVELEKOS FTP  4M.DOC 4/14/2010  11:50 AM 
Spring 2010] Use of Article 31(3)(c) 673 
 
court abstained in Loizidou from resorting to systemic integration, its 
objective was to establish jurisdiction on the basis of the effective extra-
territorial control exercised by Turkey over the TRNC. By contrast, in 
Banković the ECtHR relied explicitly on Article 31(3)(c) to demonstrate 
that—with the exception of a handful of cases, including Loizidou, 
where extraterritorial jurisdiction applies—jurisdiction remains in prin-
ciple territorial. However, by placing emphasis on the rule of 
territoriality in the exercise of jurisdiction, the court implicitly corrobo-
rated the “exception,” that is, its rather arbitrary artifice in Loizidou to 
silently isolate the criterion of effective control from the norms regulat-
ing the attribution of internationally wrongful acts and apply it as a 
criterion for the delimitation of jurisdiction.182  
More specifically, in Banković the court based its reasoning mainly 
on two axes: the ordinary meaning of the term “jurisdiction”183 and the 
intention of states as reflected both by their practice184 and in the travaux 
préparatoires.185 Interestingly, although this was not the first time that the 
systemic integration method was deprived of autonomous standing, it 
was the very first time that it was seen to operate as an auxiliary com-
plement, not to the special object and purpose of the Convention but to 
state will. Hence, in order to conclude that “from the standpoint of pub-
lic international law, the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily 
territorial,”186 the court resorted to a (highly superficial) comparative 
analysis of a limited number of international human rights treaties187 and 
mainly to the extensive citation of views expressed within legal scholar-
ship.188 Interestingly, the court relied on Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT not 
to introduce into its reasoning relevant norms of international law but 
rather to refer to the “teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of 
                                                                                                                      
 182. See generally Vassilis Tzevelekos, In Search of Alternative Solutions: Can the State 
of Origin Be Held Internationally Responsible for Investors’ Human Rights Abuses that Are 
Not Attributable to It?, 35 Brook. J. Int’l L. 155 (2010). That article contends that the rules 
governing attribution are secondary state obligations that refer to state responsibility. By con-
trast, the concept of jurisdiction—both territorial and extraterritorial—stems from the 
framework of primary state obligations and serves as the basis for delimiting the sphere of 
competence. Therefore, the questions of attribution and extraterritoriality are regulated by 
different bodies of law and should have been treated by the ECtHR separately. Id. 
 183. Id. at 351–54; see also ECHR, supra note 3, art. 1 (“The High Contracting Parties 
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I 
of this Convention.”). 
 184. Banković, 2001–XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 352. 
 185. Id. at 353. 
 186. Id. at 351. 
 187. Banković v. Belgium, 2001–XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 331, 357–58. 
 188. Id. at 351–52. 
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the various nations.”189 Apparently, in addition to establishing that it was 
not the state’s volonté to diverge from the ordinary meaning of the term 
“jurisdiction,” the court was mainly attempting to justify its own “vo-
lonté” to abstain artfully from exercising jurisdiction over an extremely 
technical and highly politicized case.190 
Moving to another example, the court has been equally constrained 
to resort to general international law in order to decide on delicate ques-
tions of state responsibility that are not regulated by its own incomplete 
special regime. Turning to the emblematic work of the ILC, the court 
concluded in Ilaşcu191 that “[a] State may . . . be held responsible even 
where its agents are acting ultra vires or contrary to instructions.”192 By 
the same token: 
A wrongful act may be described as continuing if it extends over 
the entire period during which the relevant conduct continues 
and remains at variance with the international obligation . . . . 
. . . [I]n the case of a series of wrongful acts or omissions, the 
breach extends over the entire period starting with the first of the 
acts and continuing for as long as the acts or omissions are re-
peated and remain at variance with the international obligation 
concerned . . . .193 
The ECHR, like every other international treaty, introduces legal ob-
ligations that, when breached, entail a number of secondary international 
responsibility obligations owed by the state to which the wrongful con-
duct is attributed. Despite its specialized subject matter and the 
consequently unavoidable deficient format of its text, the drafters of the 
Convention opted to expressly regulate certain issues related to the sec-
ondary obligations of states that violate the Convention’s substantive 
provisions. Article 41 of the ECHR, for instance, refers to the obligation 
of states to offer “just” satisfaction to the victim of a human rights viola-
tion. Clearly, this obligation corresponds to Articles 31 and 34 of the ILC 
Norms on State Responsibility,194 which require that a certain form of 
                                                                                                                      
 189. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 3 Bevans 1179. Article 38 of the ICJ Statute attributes to legal scholarship the status of 
secondary source of international law. 
 190. The case concerned the international responsibility of the member states of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for human rights violations allegedly committed 
in the course of the humanitarian military intervention in the former Yugoslavia. See Banković, 
2001–XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 340–41. 
 191. Ilaşcu v. Moldova, 2004–VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. 
 192. Id. at 264. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See ILC Norms on State Responsibility, supra note 74, art. 31 (“The responsible 
State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally 
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reparation be made available to the victim. In this example, Article 41 of 
the ECHR constitutes lex specialis.195 Yet, as it is all too easy to imagine, 
not all questions about the extent, nature, and modalities of the secon-
dary obligations of ECHR states parties could have been regulated by its 
text. Nevertheless, there are a number of secondary international obliga-
tions that—although not explicitly provided in it—are inherent to the 
special nature of an instrumentum aimed at protecting human rights. For 
example, it would be inconceivable for a human rights treaty to provide 
only for the pecuniary satisfaction of the victim without requiring an 
immediate cessation of the wrongful act and guarantee of non-
repetition.196 
If, finally, one takes into account the fact that the ECHR is silent as 
to some of the most fundamental aspects of state responsibility, then it 
comes as no surprise that it also does not regulate the extremely thorny 
question of the responsibility of its states parties for human rights viola-
tions committed by international organizations of which they are 
members.197 Although in the Banković case the ECtHR skillfully avoided 
shedding light on this issue by playing the “extraterritoriality game,” in 
the Behrami & Saramati case,198 answering this very same question was 
a prerequisite for the establishment of jurisdiction—or rather, as will be 
explained below, for avoiding the exercise of jurisdiction. This extremely 
complex case is very important for this study for many reasons. First, 
like all the other cases included in this section, it demonstrates how it is 
essential for the court to turn to general international law in order to deal 
with preliminary questions that fall outside the subject matter of the 
                                                                                                                      
wrongful act. . . . Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the inter-
nationally wrongful act of a State.”); id. art. 34 (“Full reparation for the injury caused by the 
internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, 
either singly or in combination, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.”). 
 195. Thus, the reparation in the ECHR regime takes the form of a “just” satisfaction. 
Moreover, according to Article 41 of the ECHR, just satisfaction is to be given “if the internal 
law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made.” 
ECHR, supra note 3, art. 41. 
 196. See ILC Norms on State Responsibility, supra note 74, art. 30 (“The State responsi-
ble for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation: (a) To cease that act, if it is 
continuing; (b) To offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circum-
stances so require.”). The obligations to cease and not to repeat the illicit act are seen to form 
an inherent part of the so-called substantive effect of the final judgments of the ECtHR, that is, 
the obligation upon states not only to execute, but, more broadly, to comply with the judg-
ments of the Court. See ECHR, supra note 3, art. 46(1); see, e.g., Gérard Cohen-Jonathan, 
Quelques considérations sur l’autorité des arrêts de la Cour européenne des Droits de 
l’Homme, in Marc-André Eissen, Liber amicorum 39, 49–50 (1995). 
 197. This scenario is to be distinguished from one in which an ECHR state party breach-
es its obligations under the Convention in order to comply with conflicting international 
obligations originating from its membership in another international organization.  
 198. See Behrami v. France & Saramati v. France, Germany, & Norway, App. Nos. 
71412/01 & 78166/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 2, 2007) (decision as to the admissibility).  
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Convention. Second, the Behrami case serves as proof of the fact that, 
even when the court was “forced” to apply the systemic integration tech-
nique to questions not regulated by its own regime, its selectiveness 
remained intact. The court simply “shifted” from selectiveness in the 
choice of preferable methods of interpretation to selectiveness in the de-
termination of which relevant norms of international law will be used as 
the basis of its dictum. Clearly, reliance upon certain norms implies si-
lent exclusion of others that apparently do not favor the desired judicial 
outcome. Third, in the Behrami case, the court comprehensively applied 
the systemic integration method of interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) and 
in so doing explicitly recalled the potential that this technique offers199 in 
resolving at least three different issues: (1) the nature and legal status 
under international law of the international actors operating in the terri-
tory where the alleged violations took place; (2) the genesis, nature, and 
extent of the respective competences of these actors; and, (3) the more 
complex question of the attribution of the alleged violations.  
The applicants in Behrami alleged that their relative’s death and in-
juries had been caused by the failure of the French Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) troops to mark and/or defuse the un-detonated cluster bombs 
which KFOR had known to be present. KFOR was defined by the court 
as an international security force, performing its tasks under the effective 
control of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).200 While act-
ing under Chapter VII of the Charter, the U.N. Security Council 
delegated the power to establish an international security presence over 
the territory of Kosovo to the subjects co-forming KFOR.201 KFOR’s in-
volvement was described in terms of a “service provider” whose 
personnel acted on behalf of the United Nations’ Interim Administration 
of Kosovo (UNMIK).202 UNMIK was conceived as a U.N. subsidiary 
organ to which the Security Council delegated, always under Chapter 
VII of the U.N. Charter, the power to administer Kosovo.203 Its actions or 
omissions were directly attributable to the United Nations itself.204  
The case of the second applicant, however, was different. The appli-
cant in Saramati complained about his detention by KFOR and, 
therefore, his allegations concerned responsibilities that fell directly un-
der the security mandate of KFOR.205 As far as the question of the 
                                                                                                                      
 199. Id. ¶ 122. 
 200. Id. ¶¶ 114, 70. 
 201. Id. ¶ 129. 
 202. Id. ¶ 125. 
 203. Id. ¶ 129. 
 204. Behrami v. France & Saramati v. France, Germany, & Norway, App. Nos. 71412/01 
& 78166/01, at ¶ 129 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 2, 2007) (decision as to the admissibility). 
 205. Id. ¶ 126. 
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attribution of the conduct of KFOR’s military personnel was concerned, 
the court structured its reasoning around the argument of a virtual, multi-
level pyramid of control, at the peak of which it placed the Security 
Council. The argument was constructed in two stages.  
First, the court attributed the alleged misconduct to NATO through 
the theory of effective control. Looking to Article 5 of the ILC’s Draft 
Norms on the Responsibility of International Organizations,206 the court 
concluded NATO exercised sufficient effective control over the military 
actions through its effective, hierarchical chain of command, even 
though NATO’s command over operational matters was not exclusive.207 
Second, the court relied on the doctrine of delegation of powers. This 
time through Article 31(3)(c) the court considered not only the relevant 
Security Council resolutions that delegated powers to NATO, but also 
relevant studies by legal scholars that confirmed the court’s understand-
ing of the nature of the delegation of powers.208 Consequently, according 
to the ECtHR, despite NATO’s effective control over the conduct in 
question, the Security Council remained at the top of the pyramid as the 
institution maintaining “ultimate authority and control” over the for-
mer.
209
 “In such circumstances, the Court observe[d] that KFOR was 
exercising lawfully delegated Chapter VII powers of the [U.N. Security 
Council] so that the impugned action was, in principle, ‘attributable’ to 
the [United Nations] . . . .”210 Therefore, the court concluded, the alleged 
violations were properly attributed to a subject of international law dif-
ferent than the respondent states, and thus did not come under the 
ECtHR’s competence ratione personae.211 
It is essential to note at this point of the analysis that in naming the 
Security Council as the primary, ultimate, and exclusive subject of law to 
which the alleged breaches of the ECHR would be attributed, the court 
relied upon a rather academic and highly abstract argument which, al-
though in complete harmony with the doctrinal schemes proposed by a 
number of authors,212 still had little to do with the primary task of a 
                                                                                                                      
 206. Id. ¶¶ 30–31 (citing ILC, Responsibility of International Organizations: Titles and 
Texts of the Draft Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 Adopted by the Drafting Committee, art. 5, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.648 (May 27, 2004) (“The conduct of an organ of a State . . . that is placed at the 
disposal of another international organization shall be considered under international law an 
act of the latter organization if the organization exercises effective control over that con-
duct.”)). 
 207. Behrami v. France & Saramati v. France, Germany, & Norway, App. Nos. 71412/01 
& 78166/01, ¶¶ 135–41 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 2, 2007) (decision as to the admissibility). 
 208. See id. ¶¶ 129–31. 
 209. Id. ¶ 134. 
 210. Id. ¶ 141. 
 211. Id. ¶¶ 141–52. 
 212. Although the court claimed to use the terms “authorise” and “delegate” inter-
changeably, id. at 43, it actually silently applied the “delegation of powers” theory, see id. 
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judicial organ, namely the pursuit of justice based on the facts specific to 
the case before it. To be more explicit, aside from confirming whether 
behavior like that in the Behrami case was “in principle, ‘attributable’ to 
the UN,”213 the ECtHR’s role was to investigate whether the particular 
facts of the case before it verified this general rule of attributability to 
the United Nations. Yet, even if the outcome of such a fact-based test had 
ratified the thesis advanced by the court,214 it is difficult to imagine what 
would have stopped it from applying the systemic integration technique 
one last time in order to resort to former Article 28(1) of the ILC Draft 
Norms on the Responsibility of International Organizations.215 Article 
28(1) would have explicitly authorized the court to pierce the institu-
tional veil of international organizations in order to hold member states 
responsible for the alleged wrongful conduct.216 That explained, it be-
comes evident that selectiveness in judicial reasoning is thus extended 
far beyond a simple choice of the preferable methods of interpretation: 
the court enjoyed an equally wide margin of discretion in the selection of 
the relevant normative elements to which it referred.  
                                                                                                                      
¶¶ 133–36. For a discussion of this theory, see Danesh Sarooshi, The United Nations and 
the Development of Collective Security: The Delegation by the UN Security 
Council of Its Chapter VII Powers 163–66 (1999). By adopting this theory, the court 
tacitly rejected the theory of “authorization,” which emphasizes the dual nature, both institu-
tional and decentralized, of operations like that of KFOR. At the decentralized level, the 
wrongful conduct could have been directly attributable to the member states. See Linos-
Alexandre Sicilianos, I exousiodotisi tou Symbouliou Asfaleias tou OHE gia chrisi 
vias [Authorization by the UN Security Council to Use Force] 168 et seq. (2003); 
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Entre multilatéralisme et unilatéralisme: l'autorisation par le 
Conseil de sécurité de recourir à la force, 339 Recueil des Cours de L’Academie de Droit 
International 109 et seq. (2008). 
 213. Behrami v. France & Saramati v. France, Germany, & Norway, App. Nos. 71412/01 
& 78166/01 ¶ 141 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 2, 2007) (decision as to the admissibility). 
 214. See, for example, the critical comments by Paolo Palchetti, Azioni di forze istituite 
o autorizzate delle Nazioni Unite davanti alla Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo: I casi Be-
hrami e Seramati, 90 Rivista di diritto internazionale 681 (2007) (concluding that the 
Security Council did not, in practice, exercise overall control over the forces participating in 
KFOR).  
 215. ILC, Responsibility of International Organizations: Titles and Texts of the Draft 
Articles Adopted by the Drafting Committee on 31 May 2006: Addendum, art. 28, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.687/Add.1 (July 19, 2006) (“A State member of an international organization incurs 
international responsibility if it circumvents one of its international obligations by providing 
the organization with competence in relation to that obligation, and the organization commits 
an act that, if committed by that State, would have constituted a breach of that obligation.”). 
Interestingly, the examples cited by ILC in its explanatory report are all taken from the case 
law of the ECtHR. See ILC, Report of the Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess. Supp. 
No. 1, at 283–86, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006). 
 216. See Manolis Ioannou, I ypothesi Behrami-Saramati sto EDDA kai to adoxo telos tis 
[The Behrami-Saramati Case Before the ECtHR and Its Inglorious End], 2 Efarmoges Di-
mosiou Dikaiou 478 (2008). 
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In the Behrami case, however, it is obvious that the court did not 
wish to leave any room for misinterpretation of its intentions. Thus, al-
though it did not explicitly name Article 28(1), it openly confirmed its 
power to examine on the merits allegations of wrongful conduct arising 
from its states parties’ participation in other international organiza-
tions—especially when, within these organizations, the standards of 
protection of the Convention’s rights were proven to be “manifestly defi-
cient.”217 Having stated this, the court went on to explain why, in the light 
of the circumstances of the Behrami case, piercing the institutional veil 
of the organization to which the allegedly wrongful conduct was attrib-
utable had not been an option: the fact central to its reluctance to 
exercise jurisdiction effectively was the “imperative nature”218 of the 
peace and security objectives entrusted by the international community 
to the Security Council. If the court were to exercise jurisdiction, the 
effect of the ECHR would have been to interfere with state conduct un-
der Chapter VII U.N. Security Council resolutions.219 Moreover, if the 
ECtHR were to exercise indirect control over the Security Council via 
the common member states of the two respective international organiza-
tions, its practice would have come into conflict with Articles 25 and 103 
of the U.N. Charter.220 Thus while systemic integration arm of the 
Behrami case contained one last bullet, the court chose not to use it in 
order to favor the human rights telos of its Convention (as it usually 
does). Instead it applied systemic integration to justify a foregone con-
clusion of judicial self-restraint. 
To be fair to the Strasbourg Court, it has to be admitted that it did no 
more than follow the tempo set by the ICJ.221 Certainly, giving priority to 
systemic orthodoxy does not come free of cost. The green light it ap-
pears to have given the Security Council, and the promise for everlasting 
immunity, constitute a costly surrender of its own power, detrimental to 
its very raison d’être (the effective protection of human rights). Although 
it would be easy for a skillful court like the ECtHR to point its finger at 
the maestro, that is, the ICJ, a judge of Strasbourg is undoubtedly aware 
that the systemic symphony to which she submits so eagerly does not 
necessarily guarantee a satisfactory acoustic outcome. If the essence of 
the unity of international law is the avoidance of fragmentation at any 
                                                                                                                      
 217. Behrami v. France; Saramati v. France, App. Nos. 71412/01 & 78166/01 ¶ 145 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. May 2, 2007) (decision as to the admissibility). 
 218. Id. ¶ 148; see also id. ¶ 149. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. ¶¶ 27, 147 (citing Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal 
Convention Arising from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 14) 
(declining, in a famous decision, to review the Security Council acts)). 
 221. See Lockerbie, 1992 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 14). 
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price, then the use of the systemic integration technique in the Behrami 
case can be evaluated as successful. But what makes the application of 
Article 31(3)(c) in Behrami a success story is not so much the aptitude 
of systemic integration to bridge normative elements that are formally 
disconnected. On the contrary, this effectiveness seems to result from the 
Strasbourg judge’s cognizance that her very own judicial forum is part of 
a broader, pluralistic, institutional architecture—the de facto rules of 
which she is “obligated” to submit to. In substance, then, the Behrami 
decision primarily emphasizes the institutional rather than the normative 
dimension of integration. Moreover, as the next section will briefly show, 
this is not the first time that this technique has been placed at the service 
of the institutional idiomorphic economy of the international system. 
B. Institutional Aspects: Abuse of 
the Systemic Integration Technique? 
In contrast with normative fragmentation, discussed in Part III.A 
above, the prevailing characteristic of the judicial dimension of institu-
tional fragmentation is incoherence in judgments delivered by 
institutionally disconnected international judicial fora ruling over for-
mally distinct cases, which, although founded on different legal bases, 
present common, or at least similar facts and, in certain instances, even 
common parties. Arguably, the ECtHR’s judgment in Bosphorus222 con-
stitutes an exemplary piece of judicial diplomacy in which the court 
avoided threatening both the institutional and normative unity of interna-
tional law, through its sui generis application of the systemic integration 
technique. While Bosphorus provides important inspiration to judicial 
institutions seeking to avoid bringing the stigma of devastating interna-
tional systemic harmony upon their heads, as other ECtHR case law 
demonstrates, there are also alternative, equally effective, and less pre-
tentious and activist ways for a forum to serve unity.223 Nevertheless, the 
                                                                                                                      
 222. Bosphorus v. Ireland, 2005–VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 107. 
 223. See, for example, the so-called Norwegian Religious Education Cases, in which the 
applicants, after being divided into two groups so as to avoid the lis pendens barrier, brought 
their common case simultaneously before two different fora (the U.N. Human Rights Commit-
tee (HRC) and the ECtHR). Both institutions declared the cases admissible, examined them on 
the merits, and delivered converging dicta. Hum. Rts. Comm’n [HRC], Views: Comm. No. 
1155/200, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/1155/2003 (Nov. 23, 2004); Folgerø v. Norway, 46 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 1147 (2008). The ECtHR, which was the second jurisdiction to decide the case on 
the merits, limited its reference to the HRC’s decision to a simple, but verbatim, reproduction 
of the reasoning reported in its facts section. Id. at 1166–69. However, Strasbourg avoided 
making further reference to HCR’s dictum and proceeded with its own, autonomous analysis 
on the basis of the ECHR. While remaining faithful to their traditional reasoning methodolo-
gies, the two fora reached converging conclusions. See Lucas Lixinski, Choice of Forum in 
International Human Rights Adjudication and the Unity/Fragmentation Debate: Is Plurality 
the Way Forward?, 2008 Italian Y.B. Int’l L. 183. 
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court’s reasoning in Bosphorus is of particular importance to this study 
because of the imaginative role it assigned to Article 31(3)(c) in combat-
ing fragmentation. 
The facts of the case are as follows: the applicant corporation 
brought a complaint against Ireland alleging that Ireland had violated its 
right to property when it impounded its assets—namely two aircrafts 
leased from the national airline of former Yugoslavia.224 Interestingly, the 
reason the respondent state had interfered with the applicant’s right to 
property was in an effort to comply with a European Community (E.C.) 
law,225 which in turn was adopted in execution of a Security Council 
resolution imposing sanctions on the former Yugoslavia following its 
armed conflict.226 Failure to honor its Community law obligations would 
have caused Ireland to apply conditionality in implementation of its E.C. 
and U.N. obligations, in the name of human rights. Faced with this di-
lemma, the Supreme Court of Ireland referred the Bosphorus case to the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling.227 After con-
cluding that the Irish authorities had appropriately applied the E.C. 
regulation at issue (in impounding the former Yugoslavian property), the 
ECJ proceeded to balance the right to property against the general inter-
est behind the regulation. In its proportionality analysis, the ECJ pointed 
to the importance of proper implementation of the Security Council reso-
lutions, which sought to bring an end to the ongoing conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia and to restore peace and security. The court concluded 
that, given the importance of these objectives, interference with the ap-
plicant corporation’s right to property was not disproportionate.228 
Having received no relief at domestic level, the applicant next turned 
to Strasbourg. The starting point of the ECtHR was to qualify the con-
duct of the respondent government as “a control of the use of the 
[applicant’s] property,”229 which the court concluded under the facts of 
the case did not amount to an expropriation. Rather, the court deter-
mined, the conduct of the Irish authorities fell under the second 
paragraph of Article 1 of the 1st Protocol of the Convention, which rec-
ognizes that states are entitled to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest.230 Maintaining its usual line of rea-
soning, the court next questioned whether there existed a legal basis 
allowing interference into the applicant’s right. In so doing, it defined the 
                                                                                                                      
 224. Bosphorus, 2005–VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 115–19. 
 225. Id. at 126–30. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Case C–84/95, Bosphorus v. Minister for Transport, 1996 E.C.R. I–03953. 
 228. Id. at I–3975 to I–3977. 
 229. Bosphorus v. Ireland, 2005–VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, 152–53. 
 230. Id. 
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duty of the Irish Government to comply with its obligations flowing 
from the E.C. legal order.231 
Traditionally, the final step in the Court’s reasoning in similar cases 
is the application of the proportionality test. However, while the ECtHR 
proceeded explicitly with just such a proportionality test, instead of fo-
cusing—as the ECJ had—on the essence of the general interest 
underlying both the Security Council resolution and the consequent E.C. 
regulation, the ECtHR looked explicitly toward the systemic integration 
method of interpretation, recognizing “the growing importance of inter-
national co-operation and of the consequent need to secure the proper 
functioning of international organisations.”232 The court concluded that 
the respondent state’s interference with the applicants’ property in com-
pliance with its obligations under E.C. law constituted “a legitimate 
general-interest objective within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1.” 233  
What the court did not make clear in its judgment is whether, beyond 
the rather general and superficial reference it made to the maxim pacta 
sunt servanta, it also considered that “international cooperation” and the 
“proper functioning of international organisations” are general interna-
tional law obligations for states.234 The above analysis of ECtHR case 
law has demonstrated that the court understands the reference within Ar-
ticle 31(3)(c) to “relevant rules of international law” to cover a 
remarkably ample range of normative elements (such as soft and hard 
law instruments, international custom, international case law, and even 
legal scholarship). However, the surprising element of Bosphorus is that 
the reason the court resorted to systemic integration was not to introduce 
any of these normative sources of international law but rather was based 
upon an exceptional sort of international necessity—that is, the “need” 
to secure the proper functioning of the E.C. legal order.235 The language 
of the judgment clearly points towards a strong interrelation between 
Article 31(3)(c) and the fulfillment of this “need.” In its reference to Ar-
ticle 31(3)(c), the ECtHR defined the need for the respondent state to 
respect its international obligations vis-à-vis a third international organi-
zation (namely the E.C.) as the legitimate counterbalance to the 
applicant’s right to property—and not the general interest objective that 
correspond to the raison d’être, or rather, the material source of the obli-
gations emanating from that organization. In other words, through 
systemic integration, the court silently incorporated the general interest 
                                                                                                                      
 231. Id. at 153–56. 
 232. Id. at 156 (citations omitted); see also id. at 156–59. 
 233. Id. at 157 (citation omitted). 
 234. Id. at 156. 
 235. Bosphorus v. Ireland, 2005–VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, 156. 
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defined by the ECJ (namely, the protection of international peace and 
security) into its concerns about institutional overlap and harmonious 
compliance with conflicting international legal obligations. Hence, in-
stead of limiting the use of Article 31(3)(c) to its classic normative 
function in a typical conflict of norms between the Convention and the 
E.C. regulation or the Security Council resolution, the court opted to 
widen the spectrum of systemic integration so that the latter also de-
picted the institutional dimensions of the problem. Doing so inevitably 
caused the central question to change: rather than targeting harmoniza-
tion or setting priorities among the effects of two conflicting 
international norms, the court focused on coordinating the practice of 
two different judicial fora, which although corresponding to distinct re-
gimes rule on a common question introduced by a single case. 
Nonetheless, the ECtHR’s decision to abstain from exercising indi-
rect control of compatibility between the ECHR and the relevant E.C. 
law entails certain consequences. By dislocating general interest and ex-
amining it through the distorting lens of institutional coordination, the 
ECtHR deprived itself of the possibility of proceeding with a test of pro-
portionality analogous to that exercised by the ECJ. In addition, the 
ECtHR also clearly undermined the soundness of its own test. Due to the 
institutional orientation introduced by systemic integration, the propor-
tionality test—in the course of the analysis—was converted into an in 
abstracto test of “equivalent protection.” Much like in Al-Adsani, the 
court seems to have abused Article 31(3)(c) in order to escape reasoning 
over proportionality.236 
Instead, the question raised by the court as the basis for its analysis 
was “whether, and if so to what extent, that important general interest of 
compliance with [E.C.] obligations [could] justify the impugned interfer-
ence by the Irish State with the applicant company’s property rights.”237 
Although states are generally free to transfer sovereign power to interna-
tional organizations, they remain responsible for any breach of the 
Convention, even if the breach occurs when acting in compliance with 
conflicting international obligations stemming from these organizations.238 
Nonetheless, “[i]n the Court’s view, State action taken in compliance with 
such legal obligations is justified as long as the relevant organisation is 
considered to [be] protect[ing] fundamental rights . . . in a manner which 
can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention pro-
vides.”239 Thus, the court allowed a shift from the proportionality test to an 
                                                                                                                      
 236. See Part III.A (discussing Al-Adsani). 
 237. Bosphorus v. Ireland, 2005–VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, 157. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 158 (internal citation omitted). 
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equivalent protection test. It concluded that there was no violation of the 
Convention after justifying why the protection of human rights in the 
E.C. order was, in principle, equivalent to that of its own regime.240  
Thus by endorsing the dictum of their ECJ colleagues, the ECtHR 
yielded once again to the logic of institutional systemic integration, ex-
actly as it had in Behrami. However, this time the court did not do so 
carte blanche, but rather left open an important escape clause: 
[The presumption that the EC offers a protection of human 
rights equivalent to the level of the ECHR may] be rebutted if, in 
the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the 
protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient. In such 
cases, the interest of international cooperation would be out-
weighed by the Convention’s role as a “constitutional instrument 
of European public order” in the field of human rights. 241  
The ECtHR appears to be a courteous specialized forum respectful of 
international systemic order. The utilization in Bosphorus of systemic 
integration in service of judicial comity242 proves this very clearly. Never-
                                                                                                                      
 240. Id. at 159–61. 
 241. Id. at 158. Indeed, the ECtHR has reviewed already the compatibility of the Union 
law with the ECHR. In Matthews v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR found that exclusion of the 
people of Gibraltar from the elections for the European Parliament constituted a violation of 
the ECHR. See Matthews v. United Kingdom, 1999–I Eur. Ct. H.R. 251, 265–66, 272–73. 
However, the conflict with the Convention’s provisions in Matthews concerned E.C. primary 
law, not secondary, as in Bosphorus. The ECtHR had a second opportunity to review indirectly 
the E.C. legal order in the Senator Lines case. There, the applicant corporation, on which the 
European Commission had imposed a fine for having breached E.C. competition rules, 
brought a complaint before the ECtHR alleging violation of its right of access to justice. See 
Senator Lines GmbH v. Fifteen Member States of the European Union, 2004–IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 
331, 333. However, the ECtHR did not examine the case on the merits, since, by the time of 
its decision as to the admissibility, the issue had been resolved at the E.C. level and the case 
was moot. Id. at 345; see also Gérard Cohen-Jonathan & Jean-François Flauss, Cour eu-
ropéenne des droits de l’homme et droit international général, 94 Annuaire Français de 
Droit International 778, 791–96 (2004). See generally Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, A Tale of 
Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing European Human Rights Acquis, 43 
Common Mkt. L. Rev. 629, 640–55 (2006) (discussing the informal dialogue developed be-
tween the two courts). 
 242. On the definition of comity, see, for example, Andrea Gattini, Un Regard Procédu-
ral sur la Fragmentation du Droit International, 110 Revue Générale de Droit 
International Public 303, 323–24 (2006). See also Nikolaos Lavranos, Regulating Com-
peting Jurisdictions Among International Courts and Jurisdictions, 68 Heidelberg J. Int’l 
L. 575, 605 (2008) (qualifying the ECtHR Bosphorus judgment as an act of comity towards 
the ECJ). However, it is important to emphasize that, since the comity technique so far has 
only occasionally been practiced at the international level, it still lacks any international bind-
ing effect. Despite the efforts of legal scholarship to equip it with the force of positive law, 
general international law does not contain any norm obliging a forum to abstain from exercis-
ing its jurisdiction in favor of another court. This silence in positive law leaves ample room for 
judicial discretion as to how and when to apply comity. This is why comity can better be un-
derstood in the light of the theory of legal pluralism. Contra Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 
TZEVELEKOS FTP  4M.DOC 4/14/2010  11:50 AM 
Spring 2010] Use of Article 31(3)(c) 685 
 
theless, the court expects the same from other institutional players, at 
least within the European subsystem, where it assumes the role of a 
quasi-constitutional forum entrusted with the interpretation of an instru-
ment whose provisions establish a regional public order.243  
A pragmatic evaluation of the Bosphorus judgment requires that a 
final, important parameter be taken into consideration. As explained pre-
viously, the E.C. legislation in question was adopted in execution of a 
Security Council resolution that imposed sanctions under Chapter VII of 
the U.N. Charter. By challenging the legality of the E.C. regulation, the 
ECHR would inevitably (albeit indirectly) have had to have reviewed the 
Security Council’s resolution—a role the ECtHR categorically rejected 
in Behrami. Thus while ECtHR is clearly a courteous international insti-
tution, it remains blurred within Bosphorus as to which institution it 
really addresses this courtesy. Quite often, appearances are said to be 
deceptive—and indeed the Bosphorus judgment would seem to confirm 
this rule. 
Concluding Remarks: Attempting a Synthesis 
Can Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT serve effectively as an anti-
fragmentation tool in the hands of an international judge? The case law 
of an international judicial forum entrusted with the interpretation of a 
“special” instrument designed for the promotion of regional integration 
by means of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law suggests that 
the mission assigned to the Article 31(3)(c) can take at least four differ-
ent forms.  
When, first, the relevant rules of international law are complemen-
tary to the ECHR, ECtHR case law shows that these rules can be 
effectively absorbed by the Convention, with an expanding effect on its 
text. In this case, systemic integration works in substance as a comple-
ment to the special object and purpose of the Convention. In this 
capacity, Article 31(3)(c) allows ECtHR judges to open their regime to 
the broader international system and selectively collect normative mate-
rials (both mature and “softer” ones, based on the relevant practice of 
states, international organizations, and international judicial fora), 
                                                                                                                      
Multilevel Judicial Governance of International Trade Requires a Common Conception of 
Rule of Law and Justice, 10 J. Int’l Econ. L. 529 (2007) (contending that judicial institutions 
are committed to pursue justice in the frame of a common objective understanding of the con-
cept of the rule of law).  
 243. As Judge Ress argues in his concurring opinion in Bosphorus, Article 31(3)(c) 
“cannot be interpreted to give treaties concluded between the Contracting Parties precedence 
over the Convention.” Bosphorus v. Ireland, 2005–VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, 170 (Ress, J., concur-
ring). 
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enriching the incomplete text of the Convention and, thereby, broadening 
the semantic field of its provisions in a way that provides greater human 
rights protection but that can also easily extend further than or against 
state will. In this first scenario, the effect of Article 31(3)(c) is to rein-
force the Convention’s special telos. Whether this reinforcement leads 
towards the uniformity of international law or works as a potential 
source of fragmentation depends on the degree of maturity of the rele-
vant sources of international law incorporated into the Convention. 
However, even if the ECHR regime is proven to move faster than the 
prevailing tempo within the broader system and therefore to diverge—at 
least temporarily—from it, there is still nothing to prohibit a regional 
sub-system from introducing higher standards of protection for human 
rights. When norms are complementary, true normative fragmentation is 
highly unlikely to occur. This is because the international system can 
easily accommodate multiple schemas of human rights protection, and 
fragmentation will occur only when standards of protection adopted by 
one regime are unduly lower than or divergent from those prevailing at 
the universal level. This definitely is not occurring at the ECtHR. 
If, on the contrary, there is a conflict between the relevant norms of 
international law and the ECHR, the systemic integration method of in-
terpretation comes into play ipso facto. Although this scenario is by far 
the most important in which Article 31(3)(c) can act as a counterweight 
to fragmentation, analysis of the case law demonstrates that systemic 
integration cannot (and should not) provide more than a simple “point of 
contact” between conflicting norms. Beyond this basic function, there is 
little, if any, room at all for systemic integration to effectively promote 
the unity of international law.244 Rather, it resigns this role to classic and 
well-known techniques used to resolve conflict of norms problems. Next 
to these, special tribute must be paid to the role of the proportionality 
                                                                                                                      
 244. As Nele Matz-Lück suggests: 
[Article 31(3)(c)] is a viable principle for several tasks: filling gaps left by a treaty, 
clarifying unclear terms and generally safeguarding that terms used in a similar 
context are understood in a similar way. However, the viability of this specific kind 
of interpretation as a conflict-solution tool is less obvious. Systemic integration 
may fail if it is the system that is in many ways incoherent. 
Matz-Lück, supra note 29, at 50; see also Benn McGrady, Fragmentation of International 
Law or “Systemic Integration” of Treaty Regimes: EC Biotech Products and the Proper Inter-
pretation of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 42 J. World 
Trade 589, 607 (2008) (“Article 31(3)(c) only applies . . . to situations where two treaty obli-
gations are capable of being read together. That is, Article 31(3)(c) applies where those 
obligations are not in ‘conflict’ with one another. As such, an extraneous treaty cannot be 
applied by a decision maker and cannot modify the applicability of the treaty under interpreta-
tion. Rather, the role of the extraneous treaty is to cast light upon the question of how the 
obligations set out in the treaty under interpretation are to be applied.”) (citation omitted). 
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assessment: given the erga omnes partes nature of the ECHR’s substan-
tive provisions, proportionality is an unparalleled tool to help ECtHR 
judges balance the human rights telos of the Convention against conflict-
ing norms of international law and the general interest objectives these 
norms pursue. The aim of the proportionality tool is simply to set ad hoc 
priorities among normative effects, without affecting the normative force 
of the conflicting norms.  
The third use of systemic integration arises when the ECtHR resorts 
to general international law to fill a “lacuna” in the ECHR regime, with-
out which the ECHR could not achieve its effet utile. Given the 
specificity of the Convention’s subject matter, the case law demonstrates 
that this scenario occurs frequently. Judges often have no choice but to 
resort to general international law for answers that will ‘unlock’ the ef-
fect of the Convention. In most instances, the court uses systemic 
integration to legitimately give effect to the Convention’s telos. Nonethe-
less, it would come as no surprise if, due to the special nature of its 
instrumentum, the ECtHR silently abstained from resorting to Article 
31(3)(c). The examples analyzed in Part III.A.3, supra, indicate that, 
although systemic integration arguably functions effectively, its results 
as to the object and purpose of the ECHR are by no means predictable. 
The outcome ultimately depends on the will of the court and on the 
choices it makes in light of the circumstances of a particular case and of 
the broader political context in which the case arises. Although Article 
31(3)(c) may be extremely useful to render the ECHR effective, it has 
equally been used by the court to limit its own jurisdiction and to avoid 
deciding cases. However, whether or not it is employed in favor of or 
against the effectiveness of the ECHR, the systemic integration tech-
nique neither justifies the application of double standards in ECtHR case 
law nor remedies the absence of legitimacy in its dicta.  
Finally, although Article 31(3)(c) has often been promoted as a 
means to avoid normative fragmentation, Part III.B discussed a fourth 
and final category of cases in which the ECtHR has applied Article 
31(3)(c) as a mechanism for preventing institutional fragmentation. Al-
though strong conclusions cannot be drawn from a single case, reliance 
on Article 31(3)(c) enabled the court to reach its comity outcome in Bos-
phorus—an outcome that cannot not be explained in terms of positive 
international law nor be accommodated within it. The self-restraint the 
court voluntarily demonstrated in the name of systemic integration can 
find better explanation in legal pluralism,245 and the institutional courtesy 
                                                                                                                      
 245. See generally supra note 242 and accompanying text. For an overview of the litera-
ture on legal pluralism, see Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
1155, 1169–79 (2007). 
TZEVELEKOS FTP  4M.DOC 4/14/2010  11:50 AM 
688 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 31:621 
 
that this pluralism entails. What, however, is evident is that the effective-
ness of systemic integration in cases of institutional fragmentation may 
very well be limited by a number of imponderable external factors, such 
as the political dimensions of a case, the balance of power between the 
various fora, and the historical moment in which the cases arise. 
As a result, the overall effectiveness of systemic integration as an 
anti-fragmentation method cannot be measured in absolute terms. In-
deed, “the role of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT may have been inflated.”246 The 
safest conclusion to reach is that the ECtHR may apply Article 31(3)(c) 
in a wide variety of ways, enjoying selectiveness which extends well 
beyond its discretion on whether or not to resort to it. The court is equal-
ly free to decide which ends its application will serve and which norms 
of international law it will introduce as “relevant” to its reasoning. Clear-
ly, the Strasbourg Court is much more responsive to the spirit of Article 
31(3)(c) than to its letter (and the limitations this approach entails). As a 
result, whether rightly or wrongly, the systemic integration technique can 
only be as effective as the ECtHR wants it to be. In the end, then, the 
court is the only body competent to decide how “special” or, conversely, 
how integrated into the systemic orthodoxy it wants to be.247  
Describing in these terms the ECtHR’s use of Article 31(3)(c) gives 
rise to the question of whether the article might create a loophole facili-
tating judicial activism. Critics would emphasize that the ECtHR often 
resorts to Article 31(3)(c) in order to render possible a rather objectivist 
and less voluntarist reading of the Convention, that both expands the 
                                                                                                                      
 246. Van Damme, supra note 35, at 38. Van Damme suggests that “[i]rrespective of 
whether ‘systemic integration’ is called a concept, a principle, an approach, a technique, or an 
objective, the concrete meaning and status of ‘systemic integration’ in international law will 
eventually be developed and argued by practitioners and judges.” Id. at 27. 
 247. As Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade admits:  
Generally recognised principles or rules of international law—which the formula-
tion of the local remedies rule in human rights treaties refers to,—besides following 
an evolution of their own in the distinct contexts in which they apply, necessarily 
suffer, when inserted in human rights treaties, a certain degree of adjustment or ad-
aptation, dictated by the special character of the object and purpose of those treaties 
and by the widely recognised specificity of the international law of human rights. 
Caeser v. Trinidad & Tobago, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 123, at 299 (Mar. 11, 
2005) (Cançado Trindade, J., separate opinion) (citations omitted). This is why, as has been 
argued by two eminent former judges of the European and the Inter-American Courts of Hu-
man Rights, the ECHR and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights systems are on 
one hand, based on international law, instituted by international conventions, and therefore 
governed by the law of treaties, and on the other hand, their application may conflict with 
general international law. See Lucius Caflisch & Antônio A. Cançado Trindade, Les conven-
tions américaine et européenne des droits de l’homme et le droit international général, 108 
Revue Générale de Droit International Public 1, 60 (2004). 
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sphere of application of its substantive provisions and guarantees the 
effectiveness of its special telos.  
The counterargument, however, is strong and moves in two direc-
tions. First, not all of the (implicit or explicit) applications of Article 
31(3)(c) have enabled such a reading or outcome at all. Second, Article 
31(3)(c) may allow activism no less or no more than any other method of 
interpretation meant to promote the object and purpose of a special in-
ternational treaty. This second counterargument also explains why, in the 
case of complementarity between the ECHR and the relevant norms of 
international law, the systemic integration and dynamic techniques con-
verge or even coincide. Both methods act, in substance, as a supplement 
to teleological interpretation, thereby increasing the legitimacy of the 
court’s choice to give priority to the object and purpose of the Conven-
tion.  
This is not the only case, however, where Article 31(3)(c) serves as a 
servitore di due padroni, accommodating both methods of interpretation 
under its umbrella. If evolution is to be inherent to a non-static legal or-
der such as the international one, then the opening—by means of 
systemic integration—of the ECHR’s box towards that order should be 
equally inherent. A systemic integration which is not done in the spirit of 
evolution would be, by definition, anachronistic and therefore defective, 
deficient, and imperfect. 
Systemic integration corresponds, however, only to one of the two 
dimensions of evolutive interpretation. The evolutive/dynamic method 
extends beyond that of systemic integration, such as when ECtHR judges 
derive normative sources of inspiration from outside the international 
system. Although it may appear that the regime of the ECHR is evolving 
outside, or even in contradiction to the international legal order, one 
should recognize that, since the latter is the natural environment within 
which the ECHR operates, any deflection in its interpretation from that 
order triggers evolution within the international order and, evolution of 
the international order itself.248 That is to say, when the systemic integra-
tion and the dynamic methods of interpretation do not converge, they 
interact circularly. This non-systemic expression of evolution falls out-
side Article 31(3)(c) and generates results even having the potential to 
challenge the normative unity of international law. Yet nothing excludes 
that this phenomenon will not be temporary—for a dynamic system such 
as the international legal order disposes of the means to both reject or 
integrate any kind of evolution. Finally, venturing a more general reflec-
tion on the overall function of Article 31(3)(c), it could be argued that 
                                                                                                                      
 248. See Luzius Wildhaber, The European Convention on Human Rights and Interna-
tional Law, 56 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 217, 230–31 (2007). 
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the article provides an aperture into and out of the ECHR regime, 
through which the judges of Strasbourg can observe, consider, and pos-
sibly even integrate or modify broader international law. Ultimately this 
view cannot be but finite, and depends on a number of factors: the de-
gree of maturity or compactness of the international system, the 
momentum within it, the distance separating the judge from her broader 
socio-normative environment, and, most of all, the intentions of the judi-
cial forum. Yet even if judicial altruism could be taken for granted, 
undeniably the core of the fragmentation phenomenon—that is, the need 
in certain cases to set priorities between trade and environment, human 
rights and trade, etc.249—reflects, first and foremost, a certain discrep-
ancy, divergence, or even fragmentation in the hierarchy of values that 
are the material source for those fragmented norms within the interna-
tional arena.250 By definition, then, the answer to a post-modern question 
must be equally post-modern. 
                                                                                                                      
 249. One must refer here to the very systematic work of Joost Pauwelyn, who discusses 
the relationship between international law and World Trade Organization law. Among several 
other works by this author, see Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the 
WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 535 (2001). For a collection of essays on, 
more specifically, trade and human rights, see, for example, Human Rights and Interna-
tional Trade (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2005); Publications de l’Institut 
International des Droits de l’Homme, Commerce mondial et protection des droits 
de l’homme: Les droits de l’homme à l’épreuve de la globalisation des échanges 
économiques (2001). 
 250. See Koskenniemi, supra note 11, at 16 (arguing that “[c]onstitutionalism, as we 
know it from the national context, relies on some basic understanding of the common good 
. . . . In the international world, there is no semblance of this beyond the languages of diplo-
macy and positive law, whose fragmentation and indeterminacy provided the starting-point for 
the search for an (implicit) constitution.”) (citation omitted). 
